The Cambridge Handbook of Deliberative Constitutionalism
DOI: 10.1017/9781108289474.027
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The ‘Elite Problem’ in Deliberative Constitutionalism

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Cited by 8 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…McKay, 2018). However, while new work looks at linked or sequenced institutions, sometimes (but not always) in their social and political context, they still tend to focus on deliberation, the noun (eg., LeDuc, 2015;Levy et al, 2018), instead of the dispersed deliberative quality that a more thorough-going systemic perspective would suggest (Chambers, 2018;Landemore, 2018).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…McKay, 2018). However, while new work looks at linked or sequenced institutions, sometimes (but not always) in their social and political context, they still tend to focus on deliberation, the noun (eg., LeDuc, 2015;Levy et al, 2018), instead of the dispersed deliberative quality that a more thorough-going systemic perspective would suggest (Chambers, 2018;Landemore, 2018).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…De esta forma, el constitucionalismo fuerte ha minimizado la importancia tanto de la asignación del poder o empoderamiento democrático 63 , así como también de la calidad del razonamiento público 64 . En otras palabras, la reflexión constitucional se ha mantenido mayormente indiferente no solo ante el principio democrático 65 , sino también ante el principio de deliberación 66 .…”
Section: La Deliberación Democrática Como Ruptura En La Historia Del ...unclassified
“…In any case, courts may be just as poor at actually representing people as are other empowered elites, who are too often elitist by inclination (Papadopoulos 2012; Moore 2016). Courts may be prone to seeing even indeterminate, value-based policy matters as properly decided by experts such as themselves (Levy 2018). And when judges serve as umpires of deep controversies over rights, they may 'play for one of the teams' (Tokaji 2010: 433), due to their partisan factionalism (Dryzek 2016: 212) or their authorisation by a state whose authority may be the very matter in question (e.g.…”
Section: A Inclusive Representationmentioning
confidence: 99%