2016
DOI: 10.1080/13572334.2015.1134904
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The electoral connection of ministerial selection in the UK

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 29 publications
(30 reference statements)
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“…This reasoning seems more driven by vote-seeking considerations than by ideological ones. Almost all federal ministers are mobilized by their parties during electoral campaigns and appear on the lists (Pilet and Fiers 2013), and we know from previous empirical studies that incumbent ministers perform electorally better than other candidates (see for instance Klein and Umit 2016; Ladwig III 2019). This element may explain the party focus on some provinces rather than others: parties tend to appoint ministers that will deliver them an electoral advantage in the future election or that will help protecting the party’s electoral base in particular regions (see for instance Nikolenyi 2015 for the Indian case).…”
Section: Understanding Provincial Disproportionalitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This reasoning seems more driven by vote-seeking considerations than by ideological ones. Almost all federal ministers are mobilized by their parties during electoral campaigns and appear on the lists (Pilet and Fiers 2013), and we know from previous empirical studies that incumbent ministers perform electorally better than other candidates (see for instance Klein and Umit 2016; Ladwig III 2019). This element may explain the party focus on some provinces rather than others: parties tend to appoint ministers that will deliver them an electoral advantage in the future election or that will help protecting the party’s electoral base in particular regions (see for instance Nikolenyi 2015 for the Indian case).…”
Section: Understanding Provincial Disproportionalitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…What Strøm (1997) also highlights is the need for election and re-election for an MP to pursue either policy or office, in this respect incumbency and length of tenure is an important aspect to take into account when it comes to representation. Indeed, Klein and Umit (2016) conclude that the desire for re-election is the most important motivation for an MP and that to fulfil ministerial ambition MPs from 'safer' seats are more likely to be rewarded with a senior ministerial office than those with smaller majorities.…”
Section: Representation Constituency and Localness In The Ukmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These variables form the basis of our hypotheses -see belowbecause issues relating to personal attributes (see Rose, 1975;King, 1981;and Heppell, 2012) and ideological preferences (Heppell, 2005;Kam, Bianco, Sened and Smyth, 2010) have long been identified as the central determinants of ministerial preferment. The hypothesis on marginality is included as it is a new and emerging determinant in ministerial preferment (see Martin, 2015 andKlein andUmit, 2015).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%