The Elected but Neglected Security Council Members

Abstract

Many of the pressing policy challenges confronting the world's countries and peoplesclimate change, pandemics, food and water scarcity, terrorism, financial meltdown-are international in origin and nature, global in scope and effects, and require concerted multilateral action led by the major powers. However, the responsibility for making policy and the authority to mobilize the requisite coercive resources to tackle the threats remain vested in sovereign states. Absent a world government, the order, stability, and predictability in international transactions comes from global governance operating as a patchwork of authority structures which produce generally adhered-to norms to regulate behavior, and layers of mechanisms to punish noncompliance. 1 The architecture of global governance consists of international and regional intergovernmental organizations; a 'soft' layer of informal general-purpose groupings of states-such as the old G7, new G20, and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) groupings; as well as transnational civil society and market actors that have exploded in numbers, role, and influence. In this global governance architecture, the United Nations (UN) forms the inner core of the mandated multilateral machinery. It was established to provide a degree of predictability and order in a world in constant flux. The organization is at once the symbol of humanity's collective aspirations for a better life in a safer world for all, a forum for negotiating the terms of converting these collective aspirations into a common program of action, and the principal international instrument for realizing aspirations and implementing plans to achieve their ends. The UN's primary function is to maintain international peace and

A Review of the Academic Debate about United Nations Security Council Reform

“…Popovski argues that reform will occur, because it will be of benefit to all UN member states, and Mahbubani argues that structural reform is the inescapable choice if the countries sitting at or near the top of the current global power structure wish to remain relevant actors in the structure of global governance. Langmore and Thakur (2016) are also optimists, perhaps because they leave veto-reform out of their proposal. Whether veto-reform is viewed as harder to achieve than an expanded membership is hard to say.…”

“…The structural reform camp believes there is a decline in the UNSC's legitimacy, either as a consequence of unequal representation i.e., a structure that reflects 1945 and not today,89 or explained as a combination of unequal geographical representation and disappointing performance (inefficiency) from the council. 90 One would perhaps expect that the majority of calls for working methods reform would point out that the status of the council's legitimacy is mainly a result of its unsatisfactory performance, such as non-intervention in contemporary conflicts, e.g. Syria and Crimea, and leave out that unequal representation influences legitimacy in a negative direction.…”

In the name of democracy: UNSC reform at the intersection of discourse and governmentality

“…Studies of UNSC-reform are informed by International Relations (IR), but also draw on Studies of International Politics (IP), International Diplomacy (ID), International Organisation (IO), and International Law (IL). IR-scholars either call for a structural reform (Langmore and Thakur, 2016; Mahbubani, 2014; Schwartzberg, 2003), or for a reform of the UNSC’s working methods (Hassler, 2013; Lee, 2011; Nadin, 2016). UN experts Weiss, Luck and Daws point out the centrality of that question, and note that no reform has occurred since 1965 because of the interests of major powers and sub power’s regional rivalries (Daws, 2005; Luck, 2016; Weiss, 2011).…”

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM: new approaches to understanding and unlocking the gridlock

“…2,14,80 However, whereas this P5-E10 dynamic can make it seem like the UNSC is beneficial only for the P5, the shaping of networks across the P5-E10 division is highly valued, not the least for the E10 members. 87,88 Correspondingly, the network among the P5 countries is also significant. According to David Bosco, the network and institutionalised meetings in the council have prevented conflicts between the P5 countries through unofficial diplomacy in what he labels a concert of powers among the P5.…”

“…89 (p71) According to John Langmore and Ramesh Thakur, the E10's power has potential concerning the reform issue because an expansion of the elected membership could suffice in making the council more legitimate and effective. 88 However, the veto system displays and institutionalises great powers' geopolitical muscles in the final analysis and divides the UNSC into two layers of power and influence. Therefore, the veto system is seen by many member states and scholars as an embodiment of geopolitical inequity, 82,[90][91][92][93] which makes the issue close to inescapable when it comes to discussions about reform.…”