The Efficacy of Anger: Recognition and Retribution

Abstract

Anger is often an appropriate reaction to harms and injustices, but is it a beneficial one? Martha Nussbaum (2015;2016) has argued that, although useful in initially recruiting agents for action, anger is typically ineffective and often counterproductive to securing the political aims of the oppressed. Nussbaum argues that to be effective at enacting social change, groups and individuals alike, must move quickly out of states of anger. Feminist theorists, on the other hand, have for long highlighted the efficacy of anger, as well as its moral and epistemic value, in fighting against the oppressive status quo (Frye, 1983; Lorde, 1984;Narayan, 1988). It might be thought, therefore, that for political action to be effective, a continued state of anger is preferable. I present a novel, empirically informed, defense against Nussbaum's attack on anger's efficacy in political action. Nussbaum adheres to a traditional view on the nature of anger, which holds that anger constitutively involves a desire for retribution. The view that anger is ineffective falls out of this and is dominant in the literature, as well our everyday lives. Informed by work in social psychology, I argue that anger is far more effective than Nussbaum allows. This will give us cause to reconsider the traditional view of anger's nature that Nussbaum endorses. In doing so, I highlight anger's aim for recognition, rather than retribution, as key. I also uncover conditions that favour anger's political efficacy, as well as reasons for why the traditional view of anger has been so pervasive.

Indeterminacy in Emotion Perception

“…But even if a parent construed their agitation as anger and recognised the need to step away or call for help, we should not conclude that this reveals an egoistic and antisocial affective state. We cannot assume an exclusive bond between anger and certain motivational tendencies (Cameron, Lindquist, and Gray 2015;Silva 2021a).…”

“…This lack of determinateness is a fundamental, constitutive feature of our emotional lives. It can inspire us to think of new and better ways to conceive of ourselves and reconfigure the way we see the world around us (Silva 2021b;Harbin 2016;Jaggar 1989). The concept of moral injury, a source of relief for Chris Aaron and many other veterans, is but one such example.…”

Political anger

“…For Srinivasan, whether anger is apt doesn't “turn on the consequences, good or bad, of that anger (2018, 9). On the other hand, Silva (2021b), citing empirical evidence, argues that anger motivates collective political action, and the communication of anger “correlates with increased support for constructive and conciliatory action tendency on behalf of dominant groups” (2021b, 39).…”

Feeling Revengeful

“…Silva (2021) claims that this is what anger is after, but I think revenge, even absent anger, is after such acknowledgement. 3 Here I depart from Jeffrie Murphy's account of vindictive emotions.…”