Candidates, Parties and Voters in the Belgian Partitocracy 2018
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-96460-7_2
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The Effects of the Political Parties’ Selective Bias on Descriptive Representation: Analysis of the Candidates’ Sociological and Political Background

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Cited by 3 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Parties can shape minority representation outcomes by deciding how many migrants (and of which origins) are fielded as candidates and by placing them in more/less secure positions on electoral lists (Mügge, 2016;van der Zwan et al, 2019). Whereas parties' decisions to present diverse candidacy lists remain an important facet affecting migrants' political presence, we argue that the nomination of minority aspirants higher up on electoral lists (with greater chances of getting elected) is an equally decisive aspect that reveals parties' genuine pledges for promoting minority representation (see Dancygier et al, 2020;Dodeigne & Teuber, 2019;Geese & Schacht, 2019). In both candidate nomination and list placement processes, parties may end up favoring certain migrant groups, due to ideological congruences with those communities or strategic plans to tap into migrant voters' support (Ciornei, 2014;Sipinen, 2021).…”
Section: Demographic Concentration Parties and Migrants' Descriptive ...mentioning
confidence: 92%
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“…Parties can shape minority representation outcomes by deciding how many migrants (and of which origins) are fielded as candidates and by placing them in more/less secure positions on electoral lists (Mügge, 2016;van der Zwan et al, 2019). Whereas parties' decisions to present diverse candidacy lists remain an important facet affecting migrants' political presence, we argue that the nomination of minority aspirants higher up on electoral lists (with greater chances of getting elected) is an equally decisive aspect that reveals parties' genuine pledges for promoting minority representation (see Dancygier et al, 2020;Dodeigne & Teuber, 2019;Geese & Schacht, 2019). In both candidate nomination and list placement processes, parties may end up favoring certain migrant groups, due to ideological congruences with those communities or strategic plans to tap into migrant voters' support (Ciornei, 2014;Sipinen, 2021).…”
Section: Demographic Concentration Parties and Migrants' Descriptive ...mentioning
confidence: 92%
“…Although these representational deficits affect all legislative arenas, they can be even more unsettling at the local level, especially in municipalities with sizeable migrant populations. Local politics should be the access point where ambitious office-seekers (of any origin) start their political careers (Dancygier et al, 2020;Dodeigne & Teuber, 2019;Donovan, 2007;Garbaye, 2005;Schönwälder, 2013;Sipinen, 2021). This is due to the greater ease of recruitment for local than regional/national elections, which also relates to the number of available seats and the prestige associated with these offices.…”
Section: Demographic Concentration Parties and Migrants' Descriptive ...mentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…They require less monitoring, no rectifying communication is needed when they act on behalf of the party and no sanctions should be enacted in case they damaged the party and its image (Berz and Jankowski, 2022;Hazan and Rahat, 2015). Scholars arguably maintain that recruiting loyal candidates is selectors' preferred option because ex ante screening is less costly than ex post discipline (Dodeigne and Teuber, 2019;Kam, 2009).…”
Section: Party Goals and The Prioritisation Of Selection Criteriamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…What are selectors looking for? The literature points to conflicting demands (André et al, 2017; Dodeigne and Teuber, 2019; Frech, 2016). I argue that party selectors will primarily strive to meet core party goals.…”
Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%