The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New Survey of the 50 States

Carey, John; Niemi, Richard G.; Powell, Lynda W.; Moncrief, Gary

doi:10.3162/036298006x201742

Cited by 137 publications

(158 citation statements)

References 22 publications

(19 reference statements)

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“…We assume that incompetent politicians never achieve this and that competent politicians who choose high effort do so with certainty, while competent politicians choosing low effort achieve H with probability g , 1, so that effort (or foregone rents) increases the probability of a good outcome for competent types. We also assume that the voter prefers an incumbent who is competent for certain but who 2 A few recent studies examine the impact of the introduction of legislative term limits on the composition of state legislatures and the behavior of term-limited legislators and find mixed results (Carey et al 2006;Kousser 2005; Kurtz, Cain, and Niemi 2007 This specification has generated some confusion in the literature. For example, Johnson and Crain state that ''Besley and Case (1995a) find evidence of cyclical activity in policy variables for two-term limit states .…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits

Alt

Mesquita²,

Rose³

2011

The Journal of Politics

190

124

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We exploit variation in U.S. gubernatorial term limits across states and time to empirically estimate two separate effects of elections on government performance. Holding tenure in office constant, differences in performance by reelectioneligible and term-limited incumbents identify an accountability effect: reelection-eligible governors have greater incentives to exert costly effort on behalf of voters. Holding term-limit status constant, differences in performance by incumbents in different terms identify a competence effect: later-term incumbents are more likely to be competent both because they have survived reelection and because they have experience in office. We show that economic growth is higher and taxes, spending, and borrowing costs are lower under reelection-eligible incumbents than under term-limited incumbents (accountability), and under reelected incumbents than under first-term incumbents (competence), all else equal. In addition to improving our understanding of the role of elections in representative democracy, these findings resolve an empirical puzzle about the disappearance of the effect of term limits on gubernatorial performance over time.E lections play two potential roles in representative democracy. First, elections may mitigate moral hazard by creating accountability; that is, politicians may take costly actions on behalf of voters because they know that they will only be reelected if their performance exceeds some standard (e.g., Barro 1973;Ferejohn 1986). Second, elections may mitigate adverse selection by allowing voters to select competent types who perform better, in expectation, than an unknown challenger. Moreover, in the absence of term limits, elections allow voters to retain incumbents whose competence has increased through experience (Padro i Miquel and Snyder 2006). Thus, over time elections may help voters weed out bad types and retain good types (e.g., Ashworth 2005; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2008;Fearon 1999;Gordon, Huber, and Landa 2007;Gowrisankaran, Mitchell, and Moro 2008;Zaller 1998). 1 Empirically distinguishing the accountability and competence effects of elections has proven difficult. While Fearon (1999) emphasizes a trade-off between accountability and competence (or selecting good types), in many theoretical models, both effects operate in the same direction (Ashworth 2005;Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006;Banks and Sundaram 1998;Besley 2006;Duggan 2000). Voters' threat to reelect only incumbents believed to be good types gives politicians an incentive to exert effort in order to try to convince voters that they are ''good'' (that is, more competent than they really are). For this reason, behavior by voters that alleviates adverse selection simultaneously alleviates moral hazard.We devise an empirical strategy to isolate the two effects by exploiting variation in the length of gubernatorial term limits. The basic argument is as follows. The relative performance of incumbents in the same term, some of whom are eligible to run again and some of whom a...

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits

Alt

Mesquita²,

Rose³

2011

The Journal of Politics

190

124

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…5,6 Extensive research on state legislatures with term limits documents numerous negative effects, such as decreased responsiveness to citizens, the steep learning curve of new members, loss of institutional memory, more reliance on staff, and increased executive power. 7,8 Similar arguments are made regarding boards. 4,9 In both the corporate and nonprofit worlds, boards are typically appointed and a central concern is accountability.…”

Section: The Organization and Composition Of Lbhsmentioning

confidence: 89%

Describing Local Boards of Health: Insights from the 2008 National Association of Local Boards of Health Survey

Patton

Moon²,

Jones

2011

Public Health Rep

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Objectives. We examined findings from the 2008 National Association of Local Boards of Health Survey to provide information about this understudied entity to the public health community.Methods. The survey instrument consisted of 196 items covering five parts: (1) demographics; (2) composition and organizational structure; (3) roles, responsibilities, and authorities; (4) telecommunications infrastructure; and (5) concerns and needs. The survey was sent to chairs of local boards of health (LBHs) in 2008 (n53,276). After six months of follow-ups and reminders, and a month of data cleaning and screening, the final sample consisted of 870 respondents, for a return rate of 27%.results. LBHs tend to represent smaller communities and are primarily appointed. Governing and policy-making boards are more prevalent than advisory boards. Most boards do not have official websites or e-mail addresses of board members available to the public; however, most report the capability to receive training via webcasts. Boards express concerns and needs in a variety of areas, particularly public health law, strategic planning, and accreditation.conclusions. Little is known about the more than 3,000 LBHs across the United States that are often charged with making and enforcing public health law. This article is a first step toward providing the public health community with information about LBHs based on survey data.

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“…Because these freshman legislators no longer can consider a long-term career in their chamber, they are more able to pursue their own policy goals rather than the goals of the district. This finding should give pause to term limits reformers who see the reform as enhancing representation, and it speaks to recent scholarly debates over the representational effects of term limits (Carey et al 2003;Wright 2004). …”

Section: Explaining Variation In Representational Rolesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutions and Representational Roles in American State Legislatures

Cooper

Richardson

2006

State Politics Policy Q.

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What is the impact of a legislature's institutions on the representational roles its members adopt? We address this question by examining the role orientation of state legislators in eight states, explaining why some legislators identify more with a trustee model of representation and others identify more with the delegate model. Using ordinal logistic regression analysis on data from a survey of 447 legislators, we test for the effects of multimember districts and term limits, along with several other factors. First, we find that representational roles and behavior are related; legislators who think of themselves as delegates are much more likely to hold frequent district office hours than their counterparts who think of themselves as trustees. Second, we find that, overall, legislators are more likely to consider themselves trustees than delegates. Third, we find that multimember districts and term limits increase the likelihood that legislators think of themselves as trustees. Thus, legislative institutions can influence the representational roles legislators adopt.

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The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New Survey of the 50 States

Cited by 137 publications

References 22 publications

Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits

Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits

Describing Local Boards of Health: Insights from the 2008 National Association of Local Boards of Health Survey

Institutions and Representational Roles in American State Legislatures

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