“…One set of studies examines physician incentives from different payment schemes (such as fee-for-services and capitation payments) in a noninteractive/nonstrategic context (e.g., Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz, & Wiesen, 2015Godager, Hennig-Schmidt, & Iversen, 2016;Green, 2014;Hennig-Schmidt, Selten, & Wiesen, 2011;Hennig-Schmidt, & Wiesen, 2014). A number of recent field experiments test the susceptivity of credence good providers to overtreating their clients under different information conditions and incentives, for example, Balafoutas, Beck, Kerschbamer, and Sutter (2013) for cab drivers; Kerschbamer, Neururer, and Sutter (2016) for computer experts; Lu (2014) for endocrinology and cardiology specialists; and Gottschalk, Mimra, and Waibel (2017) for dentists.…”