2015
DOI: 10.1002/hec.3292
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The Effects of Introducing Mixed Payment Systems for Physicians: Experimental Evidence

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 93 publications
(137 citation statements)
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“…In recent years, research in health economics has started to use economic experiments to test the behavioral effects of physician payment under controlled laboratory conditions (e.g., Brosig‐Koch, Hennig‐Schmidt, Kairies‐Schwarz, & Wiesen, , ; Green, ; Hennig‐Schmidt, Selten, & Wiesen, ). Although there is an active debate on the extent to which insights from the laboratory can be generalized to the field (e.g., Herbst & Mas, ; Levitt & List, ), laboratory experiments typically serve to complement field research as they allow for a higher internal validity.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In recent years, research in health economics has started to use economic experiments to test the behavioral effects of physician payment under controlled laboratory conditions (e.g., Brosig‐Koch, Hennig‐Schmidt, Kairies‐Schwarz, & Wiesen, , ; Green, ; Hennig‐Schmidt, Selten, & Wiesen, ). Although there is an active debate on the extent to which insights from the laboratory can be generalized to the field (e.g., Herbst & Mas, ; Levitt & List, ), laboratory experiments typically serve to complement field research as they allow for a higher internal validity.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Godager and Wiesen () further observe a substantial heterogeneity in the degree of individual altruism. Focusing on mixed payment systems, Brosig‐Koch et al () demonstrate that individual responses can be accounted for by a behavioral model capturing physician altruism. In line with Godager and Wiesen (), the weight subjects attach to patients' health benefit differs substantially among subjects.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We show that the upward deviation is potentially driven by semi-altruistic behavior towards patients as in Hennig-Schmidt et al (2011), Godager and Wiesen (2013), and Brosig-Koch et al (2015a. In particular, heads of hospital are willing to give up parts of their own profits to increase patient benefits, resulting in the negative effects of mergers due to increased market concentration being less severe than in markets with profit maximizing agents only.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 88%
“…This result is in line with previous studies where participants in medically framed experiments show patient-oriented behavior towards real patients outside the laboratory, c.f. Hennig-Schmidt et al (2011), Godager and Wiesen (2013), and Brosig-Koch et al (2015a.…”
Section: Altruistic Behaviormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One set of studies examines physician incentives from different payment schemes (such as fee-for-services and capitation payments) in a noninteractive/nonstrategic context (e.g., Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz, & Wiesen, 2015Godager, Hennig-Schmidt, & Iversen, 2016;Green, 2014;Hennig-Schmidt, Selten, & Wiesen, 2011;Hennig-Schmidt, & Wiesen, 2014). A number of recent field experiments test the susceptivity of credence good providers to overtreating their clients under different information conditions and incentives, for example, Balafoutas, Beck, Kerschbamer, and Sutter (2013) for cab drivers; Kerschbamer, Neururer, and Sutter (2016) for computer experts; Lu (2014) for endocrinology and cardiology specialists; and Gottschalk, Mimra, and Waibel (2017) for dentists.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%