The effects of institutional ownership on the value and risk of diversified firms

Jafarinejad, Mohammad; Jory, Surendranath Rakesh; Ngo, Thanh

doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2015.05.019

Cited by 38 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 70 publications

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“…With reference to institutional ownership, optimal contracting theory indicates that institutional owners, as powerful stakeholders, have more incentives to monitor the opportunistic behaviours of management (Ntim et al ., ), and this is due to the fact that institutional shareholders tend to have large equity stakes in listed firms (Jafarinejad et al ., ). Institutional shareholders also enjoy various advantages over their individual or less informed counterparts, including information, knowledge and skills (Ntim et al ., ).…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 97%

Corporate Governance Disclosure Index–Executive Pay Nexus: The Moderating Effect of Governance Mechanisms

Elmagrhi

Ntim

Wang

et al. 2018

European Management Review

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This paper first employs principal component analysis technique to develop and introduce an alternative UK corporate governance disclosure index to the US-centric ones. Second, we then investigate whether this new corporate governance disclosure index can determine the level of executive pay (including CEOs, CFOs, and all executive directors) in UK listed firms, and consequently ascertain whether the governance mechanisms can moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity. Employing data on corporate governance, executive pay and performance from 2008 to 2013, we find that, on average, better-governed firms tend to pay their executives lower compared with their poorly-governed counterparts. Additionally, our findings suggest that the payfor-performance sensitivity is generally positive, but improves in firms with high corporate governance quality, implying that the pay-for-performance sensitivity is contingent on the quality of internal governance structures. We interpret our findings within the predictions of optimal contracting theory and managerial power hypothesis.

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Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 97%

Corporate Governance Disclosure Index–Executive Pay Nexus: The Moderating Effect of Governance Mechanisms

Elmagrhi

Ntim

Wang

et al. 2018

European Management Review

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“…Therefore, institutional owners in a firm look forward to harnessing more returns which in turn leaves a firm with no option but to diversify. Empirically, there exists a positive link between institutional ownership and corporate diversification (Tihanyi et al, 2003); (Deng, Elyasiani, & Jia, 2013); (Jafarinejad et al, 2015); (Gharbi & Jarboui, 2017).…”

Section: Relationship Between Institutional Ownership and Corporate Dmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To begin with, institutional investors are major actors (Gharbi & Jarboui, 2017) with control (Gomez, 2014) and influence on firm's strategy decisions (Lacoste, Lavigne, & Rigamonti, 2010). In terms of investments, institutional investors monitor and mitigate diversification discount (Hartzell, Sun, & Titman, 2014), are known to be prudent (Jafarinejad, Jory, & Ngo, 2015), careful and cautious (Bushee, Carter, & Gerakos, 2013). In the long run, such investors affect the type and level of investment decisions taken by management (Al-Thuneibat, 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the long run, such investors affect the type and level of investment decisions taken by management (Al-Thuneibat, 2018). To elaborate on the relationship between institutional ownership and corporate diversification, studies have been conducted in India (Ramaswamy, Li, & Veliyath, 2002), Europe (Hautz et al, 2013), United States (Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003); (Jafarinejad et al, 2015) and Tunisia (Gharbi & Jarboui, 2017). Secondly, foreign investors are known to have a sole objective of maximizing their portfolios (Thai, 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Effect of Ownership Structure on Corporate Diversification of Listed Firms in Kenya

Tanui

Yegon

Bonuke

2019

SJOM

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Purpose - This paper aimed to examine the moderating role of capital structure in the relationship between institutional and foreign ownerships on corporate diversification of listed firms at the Nairobi Securities Exchange, Kenya. Design/Methodology - The target population comprised of all the 65 listed firms at Nairobi Securities Exchange in Kenya. However, the inclusion criteria were based on all firms listed at the NSE from 2003 to 2017. Findings - Capital structure significantly moderated the relationship between institutional ownership and corporate diversification. However, there was a statistically insignificant moderating effect of capital structure in the relationship between foreign ownership and corporate diversification. Practical Implications - As to increase diversification, listed firms are suggested to have low levels of capital structure and institutional ownership. Furthermore, low levels of foreign ownership and high capital structure is vital in attaining high diversification levels. Originality - The study contribution is the moderating effect of capital structure in institutional ownership - corporate diversification linkage.

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“…Выбор типа ликвидации при оценке бизнеса методом ликвидационной стоимости. Российское предпринимательство, 16(13), 2021-2034. doi: 10.18334/rp.16.13.490 2023 отечественных и зарубежных авторов (Артеменков, Жуков, 2011;Горчакова, 2005;Горюнов, Бабичева, Козлова, 2010;Иванова, Шмачин, 2014;Касьяненко, 2007;Лейфер, 2006;Фоменко, 2015;Холодкова, 2013;Alderson, Betker, 1995;Belo, Lin, Vitorino, 2014;Ting, Warachka, Zhao, 2007;Golec, Gupta, 2014;Jafarinejad, Jory, Ngo, 2015;Kim, Lim, 2010;Volkov, Smith, 2015), а также в большинстве учебных пособий по оценке бизнеса 2 .…”

Section: этапы метода ликвидационной стоимостиunclassified

Выбор Типа Ликвидации При Оценке Бизнеса Методом Ликвидационной Стоимости

Захарова¹

2015

Russian Journal of Entrepreneurship

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В настоящей работе речь идет о таком механизме оценки стоимости бизнеса, как метод ликвидационной стоимости. В практике этот метод встречается не часто и является скорее исключением. Тем не менее, существуют ситуации, когда именно этот метод дает единственно корректный результат оценки. В работе раскрываются основные принципы и этапы метода ликвидационной стоимости, а также проводится исследование критериев выбора типа ликвидации, при котором стоимость бизнеса будет максимальной.

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The effects of institutional ownership on the value and risk of diversified firms

Cited by 38 publications

References 70 publications

Corporate Governance Disclosure Index–Executive Pay Nexus: The Moderating Effect of Governance Mechanisms

Corporate Governance Disclosure Index–Executive Pay Nexus: The Moderating Effect of Governance Mechanisms

Effect of Ownership Structure on Corporate Diversification of Listed Firms in Kenya

Выбор Типа Ликвидации При Оценке Бизнеса Методом Ликвидационной Стоимости

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