The Effects of Health Insurance and Self-Insurance on Retirement Behavior

French, Eric; Jones, John Bailey

doi:10.2139/ssrn.295560

Cited by 111 publications

(159 citation statements)

References 64 publications

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“…However, once individuals become eligible for Medicare at age 65, the health insurance incentive for work largely vanishes. Rust and Phelan (1997) and French and Jones (2010) document the importance of Medicare on retirement patterns. French and Jones (2010) find that Medicare was about as important as Social Security in determining retirement for the cohort that turned 65 in the late 1990s.…”

Section: B a Detailed Example: Public Pension Programs In The Usmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some good recent examples include Heyma (2004) for the Netherlands, Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez-Martín (2007) for Spain, Manoli et el. (2010) for Austria, and French (2005), French and Jones (2010) and Casanova (2010) for the US. These papers also use micro data, but have the added advantage that they can more explicitly quantify the importance of the work disincentives.…”

Section: B Structural Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In order to isolate the effect of the earnings test more cleanly, we consider a somewhat different validation exercise, using a different model that appears in French and Jones (2010).…”

Section: B Structural Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

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Public pensions and labor supply over the life cycle

French

Jones

2011

Int Tax Public Finance

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

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Section: B a Detailed Example: Public Pension Programs In The Usmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: B Structural Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

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Public pensions and labor supply over the life cycle

French

Jones

2011

Int Tax Public Finance

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“…The most likely cause of these differences is that, relative to our analysis, Hubbard et al and Palumbo understate medical expenses, both in terms of levels and riskiness (see French and Jones [20,21]), and they probably understate the extent to which medical expenditures rise with age and permanent income. We find different medical expense processes for two main reasons.…”

mentioning

confidence: 53%

“…To estimate the model, we adopt a two-step strategy, similar to the one used by Gourinchas and Parker [23], Cagetti [7], and French and Jones [20]. In the first step we estimate or calibrate those parameters that can be cleanly identified without explicitly using our model.…”

Section: The Methods Of Simulated Momentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differential Mortality, Uncertain Medical Expenses, and the Saving of Elderly Singles

2005

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People have heterogenous life expectancies: women live longer than men, rich people live longer than poor people, and healthy people live longer than sick people. People are also subject to heterogenous out-of-pocket medical expense risk. We construct a rich structural model of saving behavior for retired single households that accounts for this heterogeneity, and we estimate the model using AHEAD data and the method of simulated moments. We find that the risk of living long and facing high medical expenses goes a long way toward explaining the elderly's savings decisions. Specifically, medical expenses that rise quickly with both age and permanent income can explain why the elderly singles, and especially the richest ones, run down their assets so slowly. We also find that social insurance has a big impact on the elderly's savings.

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On the distribution and dynamics of health care costs

French

Jones

2004

J of Applied Econometrics

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177

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Using data from the Health and Retirement Survey and the Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old survey, we estimate the stochastic process that determines both the distribution and dynamics of health care costs. We find that the data generating process for log health costs is well represented as the sum of a white noise process and a highly persistent AR(1) process. We also find that the innovations to this process can be modelled with a normal distribution that has been adjusted to capture the risk of catastrophic health care costs. Simulating this model, we find that in any given year 0.1% of households receive a health cost shock with a present value of at least $125,000.

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The Effects of Health Insurance and Self-Insurance on Retirement Behavior

Abstract: The program was funded through a grant from the Social Security Administration (SSA). Each grant awarded was up to $25,000. In addition to submitting a paper, successful applicants also present their results to SSA in Washington, DC.

Cited by 111 publications

References 64 publications

Public pensions and labor supply over the life cycle

Public pensions and labor supply over the life cycle

Differential Mortality, Uncertain Medical Expenses, and the Saving of Elderly Singles

On the distribution and dynamics of health care costs

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