The effects of group size and income on contributions to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting

Goetze, Linda D.; Glover, T. F.; Biswas, Basudeb

doi:10.1007/bf01047878

Cited by 16 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…In larger communities, individuals can contribute less and achieve the same outcome—but the altruistic desire to participate in the provision of a needed public good mitigates the incentive to free‐ride altogether (i.e., to reduce contributions to zero). In fact, Goetze et al () find that in the aggregate, total contributions grow as group size increases.…”

Section: The Evolution Of the Women's Agendamentioning

confidence: 99%

Gender and Policy Agendas in the Post‐War House

Atkinson¹

2017

Policy Studies Journal

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For decades, critical mass theory shaped expectations about the ways female politicians would behave in office. Newer studies, however, have challenged the theory's premise that “token” women will avoid championing women's interests while women serving in more gender‐diverse bodies will work together to advance them. In fact, many in the discipline now believe it is time to leave the idea of critical mass behind. These new studies have significantly advanced our knowledge of the link between women's descriptive and substantive representation. But the move away from critical mass leaves unresolved the question of how female legislators will adapt their policy priorities based on changes in the size of the female delegation. I seek to answer this question and hypothesize that the more women who serve in Congress, the less attention each female member of Congress will give to women's issues, and the more diverse the female agenda will become. This diversification should not, however, result in lower overall levels of attention to women's issues. Because responsibility for substantive representation is shared, with each woman continuing to contribute as the delegation grows, the women's agenda can diversify while attention to women's issues actually increases. An analysis of bill sponsorship data spanning 60 years provides support for my theory. I show that when the size of the female delegation grows, women increase both the breadth and depth of their collective legislative agenda—simultaneously offering increased substantive representation and representation across a wider range of topics.

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Section: The Evolution Of the Women's Agendamentioning

confidence: 99%

Gender and Policy Agendas in the Post‐War House

Atkinson¹

2017

Policy Studies Journal

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“…In the case of public broadcasting one may be more likely to contribute if the other potential beneficiaries of your contribution are "people like you" with similar values. If civic norms are indeed stronger in smaller communities, "group size" in Goetze et al (1993) conceivably acts as a proxy for civic norms.…”

Section: Group Sizementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Goetze et al (1993) of a theory. In smaller communities, repeated interactions with other individuals will tend to be more common, while interactions with strangers will be far less common than in a large city.…”

Section: Group Sizementioning

confidence: 99%

Viewers Like You: Community Norms and Contributions to Public Broadcasting

Kropf

Knack

2003

Political Research Quarterly

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The logic of collective action (Olson 1965) suggests that public broadcasting may be underprovided, because non-contributors are not excluded from receiving the benefits. Why do so many individuals voluntarily contribute to public television, even though they can obtain the benefits of public television without contributing? We explore the hypothesis that giving to public broadcasting is determined in part by the strength of "civic norms" that limit the opportunistic behavior of individuals in large-numbers prisoners' dilemma settings. We also explore a variety of other explanations for charitable giving and collective action, including group size, tax deductibility, crowd out, and selective incentives.Our findings provide evidence linking civic norms and giving to public broadcasting. Education and income have indirect effects through strengthening civic norms. We find some evidence that selective incentives increase the average size of contributions among those who contribute.

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“…Firstly, broadcasting is a public good characterized (in the case of the BBC) by nonexclusivity (the technology exists and is used by other broadcasters to exclude those who do not pay) and non-rivalry (consumption of the good by one person does not reduce its availability to others. This is the 'free rider' problem in which those who do not pay are as able to consume the product as those who do pay, a particular problem as consumer group size increases (e.g., Olson 1965;Chamberlin 1978;Goetze et al 1993).…”

Section: Public Service Broadcastingmentioning

confidence: 98%