The Effects of Expanding the Generosity of the Statutory Sickness Insurance System

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This series presents research findings based either directly on data from the German SocioEconomic Panel Study (SOEP) or using SOEP data as part of an internationally comparable data set (e.g. CNEF, ECHP, LIS, LWS, CHER/PACO). SOEP is a truly multidisciplinary household panel study covering a wide range of social and behavioral sciences: economics, sociology, psychology, survey methodology, econometrics and applied statistics, educational science, political science, public health, behavioral genetics, demography, geography, and sport science. Terms of use: Documents inThe decision to publish a submission in SOEPpapers is made by a board of editors chosen by the DIW Berlin to represent the wide range of disciplines covered by SOEP. There is no external referee process and papers are either accepted or rejected without revision. Papers appear in this series as works in progress and may also appear elsewhere. They often represent preliminary studies and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be requested from the author directly. AbstractIn 1999, in Germany, the statutory sick pay level was increased from 80 to 100 percent of foregone earnings for sickness episodes of up to six weeks. We show that this reform has led to an increase in average absence days of about 10 percent or one additional day per employee, per year. The estimates are based on SOEP survey data and parametric, nonparametric, and combined matching-regression difference-in-differences methods. Extended calculations suggest that the reform might have increased labor costs by about e 1.8 billion per year and might have led to the loss of around 50,000 jobs.

The Pros and Cons of Sick Pay Schemes: Testing for Contagious Presenteeism and Shirking Behavior

“…This is in line with the standard predictions of our model and the previous literature Palme 1996, 2005;Ziebarth and Karlsson 2010;De Paola et al 2014;Ziebarth and Karlsson 2014;Fevang et al 2014). Next, and more importantly, we analyze the labor supply effects by certified disease categories.…”

“…Despite being of tremendous relevance, empirically proving the existence of presenteeism with contagious diseases is extremely difficult, if not impossible, because contagiousness is generally unobservable. Several empirical papers evaluate the causal effects of cuts in sick pay and find that employees adjust their labor supply in response to such cuts Palme 1996, 2005;Ziebarth and Karlsson 2010;De Paola et al 2014;Ziebarth and Karlsson 2014;Dale-Olsen 2014;Fevang et al 2014). 1 Traditionally, behavioral adjustments to varying levels of insurance generosity is labeled "moral hazard" in economics (Pauly 1974(Pauly , 1983Arnott and Stiglitz 1991;Nyman 1999;Newhouse 2006;Felder 2008;Bhattacharya and Packalen 2012).…”

Long-term consequences of workplace bullying on sickness absence

“…When Ziebarth and Karlsson (2010) compare the non-affected private employees with affected private employees, they find that the reduction in the replacement rate increases absence by 28%. Ziebarth and Karlsson (2014) exploit that the same reform was rolled back in 1999 such that replacement rates returned to 100%. Using the same approach, as in their previous paper, they find that increasing the replacement rate by 25% increased the number of sick days for the treated individuals by 10%.…”

Sickness Absence and Works Councils: Evidence from German Individual and Linked Employer-Employee Data

“…Furthermore, some analyses focussing on related issues suggest a positive relationship between works councils and absence of employees. Ziebarth and Karlsson (2014) In Germany, collective bargaining mainly takes place at the industry level. Therefore, the plant-level representation of employees heavily rests on the shoulders of works councils.…”