The effects of Daubert on the admissibility of expert testimony in state and federal criminal cases.

Groscup, Jennifer; Penrod, Steven D.; Studebaker, Christina A.; Huss, Matthew T.; O’Neil, Kevin M.

doi:10.1037/1076-8971.8.4.339

Cited by 72 publications

(62 citation statements)

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The role of psychological science in the legal system has burgeoned recently as well. Social or behavioral scientists constituted nearly one-quarter of all scientists in U.S. criminal appellate cases involving expert testimony from 1988 to 1998 (Groscup, Penrod, Studebaker, Huss, & O'Neil, 2002).Research examining laypeople's scientific reasoning skills has enjoyed renewed interest among social scientists and legal scholars due to several recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings on the admissibility of expert evidence (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc 1993; General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 1997; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 1999). Daubert and its progeny have entrusted judges with a gatekeeping role in which they should base their admissibility decisions on the relevance and reliability of the expert evidence.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Can jurors recognize missing control groups, confounds, and experimenter bias in psychological science?

McAuliff

Nunez

2009

Law and Human Behavior

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This study examined the ability of jury-eligible community members (N = 248) to detect internal validity threats in psychological science presented during a trial. Participants read a case summary in which an expert testified about a study that varied in internal validity (valid, missing control group, confound, and experimenter bias) and ecological validity (high, low). Ratings of expert evidence quality and expert credibility were higher for the valid versus missing control group versions only. Internal validity did not influence verdict or ratings of plaintiff credibility and no differences emerged as a function of ecological validity. Expert evidence quality, expert credibility, and plaintiff credibility were positively correlated with verdict. Implications for the scientific reasoning literature and for trials containing psychological science are discussed. KeywordsScientific reasoning; Internal validity; Expert testimony; Juror decision-making Recent advances in DNA, blood type, and fingerprint testing have increased the likelihood that average citizens will confront complex scientific evidence when serving as jurors in civil and criminal cases. Nearly two-thirds (65%) of state court judges responding to a national survey indicated that they had some experience with DNA evidence in their courtrooms (Gatowski, Dobbin, Richardson, Ginsburg, Mertino, & Dahir, 2001). The role of psychological science in the legal system has burgeoned recently as well. Social or behavioral scientists constituted nearly one-quarter of all scientists in U.S. criminal appellate cases involving expert testimony from 1988 to 1998 (Groscup, Penrod, Studebaker, Huss, & O'Neil, 2002).Research examining laypeople's scientific reasoning skills has enjoyed renewed interest among social scientists and legal scholars due to several recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings on the admissibility of expert evidence (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc 1993; General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 1997; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 1999). Daubert and its progeny have entrusted judges with a gatekeeping role in which they should base their admissibility decisions on the relevance and reliability of the expert evidence. Despite the Court's confidence in judges' ability to fulfill their gatekeeping role, many judges lack the scientific literacy required for a Daubert analysis (Gatowski et al., 2001) and have difficulty identifying methodologically-flawed expert testimony (Kovera & McAuliff, 2000a). Attorneys also struggle to effectively evaluate expert evidence (Kovera & McAuliff, 2000b). Their ability to make and successfully argue motions to exclude junk science, crossexamine an expert, or consult their own expert may be limited as a result (Kovera, Russano, & McAuliff, 2002).Based on these limitations, it is likely that at least some invalid research will reach laypeople serving as jurors in court. Can they recognize variations in the validity of psychological science? We examined this research question by presenting jury-eligible community m...

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Can jurors recognize missing control groups, confounds, and experimenter bias in psychological science?

McAuliff

Nunez

2009

Law and Human Behavior

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“…Groscup, Studebaker, Huss, O'Neil, and Penrod (2002) found the mean length of discussion of Daubert and Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 104 increased significantly following the Daubert decision, while mean length of discussion about Frye and general acceptance significantly decreased.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…It is clear that judges apply certain factors based on whether they consider the proffered testimony to be scientific, technical, or experience-based knowledge, and that they consider the findings of other courts where precedent is available. The increase in published decisions reported by Krafka et al (2002), Groscup et al (2002), and Dixon and Gill (2002) suggests that trial judges are both providing and making use of precedent as different types of evidence are being challenged. testimony.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Judicial gatekeeping and the social construction of the admissibility of expert testimony

Merlino

Murray²,

Richardson³

2008

Behavioral Sci & The Law

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Content analysis of 192 U.S. District Court cases was conducted to investigate judges' evaluations of expert characteristics and evidence characteristics for toxicology, psychological/psychiatric, and damages testimony. Judges evaluated more expert characteristics, but not more evidence characteristics, as the number of months post-Daubert increased (Hypotheses 1 and 2). More evidence characteristics were evaluated when evidence was quantitatively rather than qualitatively based (Hypothesis 3). The greatest number of evidence characteristics examined was for toxicology evidence (Hypothesis 4). Fewer expert characteristics were evaluated for admissible evidence, but more evidence characteristics were evaluated for inadmissible evidence (Hypothesis 5). All analyses were significant at .05. Implications for judges, attorneys, and experts are discussed.

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“…An empirical implication is that if biased expert testimony is more likely to be dismissed than unbiased testimony upon challenges from the opposing counsel, ceteris paribus, courts are more likely to strike the defendant's expert. In their study of criminal cases in appellate courts, Groscup et al (2002) present some evidence suggesting experts proffered by the prosecution were more likely to be admitted than experts proffered by defendants: at the trial court level, prosecution experts were admitted 95.8% of the time, but defendantappellant experts were admitted only 7.8% of the total number of times they were offered.…”

Section: Testable Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adversarial Bias, Litigation, and the Daubert Test: An Economic Approach

Kim

2016

SSRN Journal

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The last few decades have seen a dramatic shift in the admissibility of expert testimony in American courtrooms from a laissez-faire approach to a strict standard for admissibility, often called the Daubert test. The implicit rationale behind such a stringent standard for admissibility is the trier of fact's vulnerability to adversarial bias, which many legal scholars and practitioners assume to be rampant. Employing a standard litigation model in the literature, I demonstrate that client-expert relationships may not always exhibit adversarial bias and that a litigant may voluntarily present neutral expert testimony under certain situations. I also show that a litigant is more likely to deploy hired guns if the litigation environment is more favorable to his cause. In particular, the burden of proof assignment and the court's prior belief are shown to influence adversarial bias.

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The effects of Daubert on the admissibility of expert testimony in state and federal criminal cases.

Cited by 72 publications

References 2 publications

Can jurors recognize missing control groups, confounds, and experimenter bias in psychological science?

Can jurors recognize missing control groups, confounds, and experimenter bias in psychological science?

Judicial gatekeeping and the social construction of the admissibility of expert testimony

Adversarial Bias, Litigation, and the Daubert Test: An Economic Approach

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