“…Other economic models (e.g., of employee and customer discrimination, search costs, statistical discrimination, imperfect competition, self-fulfilling prophecies, gender differences in efficiency-wage effects, wage bargaining; see, e.g., Altonji and Blank 1999;Coate and Loury 1993;Haagsma 1993;Rosen 2003) are able to explain that discrimination can be persistent under strengthening competition in the product market, but none of them predicts that inefficient discrimination which is not based on differences in variance of the productivity distribution or reliability of individual information between groups may even increase under competitive pressure 3 (see Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 2007, for a recent overview of the empirical and theoretical literature). More importantly, (almost) all economic models seem to assume that the extents to which employers rely on stereotypic perceptions and prejudice are fixed and do not change endogenously.…”