The effects of clinical and scientific expert testimony on juror decision making in capital sentencing.

Krauss, Daniel A.; Sales, Bruce D.

doi:10.1037/1076-8971.7.2.267

Cited by 128 publications

(131 citation statements)

References 69 publications

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“…Numerous concerns exist over the use of mock juror research despite its application to various law-related topics including, but not limited to, comprehensibility of jury instructions (e.g., Rose & Ogloff, 2001) and expert witness testimony (e.g., Krauss & Sales, 2001 in that jury-eligible and student samples resulted in nearly identical verdict outcomes. Also germane to the present study is that previous mock juror research showed student and jury samples as equally persuaded by expert witnesses (Hinkle, Smeltzer, Allen, & King, 1983).…”

Section: Justifying Use Of Mock Jurorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Witness self‐efficacy: Development and validation of the construct

Cramer

Neal

DeCoster

et al. 2010

Behavioral Sci & The Law

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The present study used a Self-Efficacy Theory (SET; Bandura, 1977Bandura, , 1986 framework to address the need for an outcome measure in witness preparation training. The construct of Witness Self-Efficacy, broadly defined as a witness's perceived ability to testify in court, was developed drawing largely on existing self-efficacy literature. The goal of the study was to establish initial psychometric properties for the Witness Self-Efficacy Scale (WSES).Participants acting either as mock witnesses or jurors took part in a two-phase study.First, 41 mock witnesses were asked to provide a written account of being falsely accused of an act. They were then briefly deposed about the account, and completed the WSES and construct validity questionnaires. Mock witnesses finally testified under cross-examination from a mock attorney about the accusations. In the second portion, a total of 290 mock jurors (six to eight per group) observed videotaped testimonies of participants from phase one. Mock jurors then provided predictive validity ratings of witness credibility, believability, innocence likelihood, efficacy, and agreement with testimony.Bi-variate correlation analyses showed that the WSES was significantly positively related with general self-efficacy, social self-efficacy, and general self-confidence. The WSES was significantly negatively related to introversion. The scale displayed non-significant relations with social desirability, depression, self-esteem, and innocence expectancy. Multivariate regression analyses showed that the scale failed to predict any of the primary mock juror ratings.Follow-up multivariate regression analyses showed that mock juror ratings of witness confidence iii and the WSES predicted dependent measures, although these independent variables were collinear. Finally, there was an interaction between self and observer ratings of the WSES as it predicted witness credibility.Results are discussed with regard to theoretical and applied implications. Contrary to SET, self-reported WSE appears to be largely correlated with confidence and fails to predict outcomes on its own. Concerning witness preparation, the WSES possesses solid construct validity and reliability, but requires further testing within a witness preparation training model to assess its practical utility. A self-efficacy based method of witness preparation is proposed as a manner of continued research using the WSES.

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Section: Justifying Use Of Mock Jurorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Witness self‐efficacy: Development and validation of the construct

Cramer

Neal

DeCoster

et al. 2010

Behavioral Sci & The Law

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“…Although past research (Krauss & Lee, 2003;Krauss & Sales, 2001) has compared the influence of expert testimony based on actuarial instruments to pure clinical judgments, we know of no research to date that has also examined a guided professional judgment risk assessment tool and its influence on juror decision-making. Given the increased use of such instruments, this is an oversight in need of correction.…”

Section: Advances In Risk Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Kansas v. Hendricks, 1997;Kansas v. Crane, 2002). Critics within the legal and psychological fields have questioned the ethics (Faust & Ziskin, 1988;Lavin & Sales, 1998), the validity (Cunningham & Reidy, 1999, 2002Edens, Petrila, & Buffington-Vollum, 2001), and the biasing effects that these potentially unreliable expert predictions might have on jury decisions (Guy & Edens, 2003;Krauss & Lee, 2003;Krauss & Sales, 2001). Although considerable advances have been made in the area of dangerousness prediction or risk assessment validity (see, e.g., Quinsey, Harris, Rice, & Cormier, 1998;Webster, Douglas, Eaves, & Hart, 1997), there still remains considerable doubt whether these new procedures are being used in actual practice (see, e.g., Melton, Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin, 1997).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, the court's assumptions in Barefoot that jury members and adversary procedures will be adequate to undo any bias caused by less scientific expert opinions has not been borne out by the limited research that has investigated these issues (e.g. Krauss & Sales, 2001). In fact, three studies that have directly investigated this question have found that jurors are more influenced (Krauss & Lee, 2003;Krauss & Sales, 2001, in a Texas death penalty case) or at least equally influenced (Guy & Edens, 2003, in a Texas sexual predator law case) by less scientifically valid clinical predictions of dangerousness when this less scientific method of assessing dangerousness was compared with more scientifically valid expert testimony.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Krauss & Sales, 2001). In fact, three studies that have directly investigated this question have found that jurors are more influenced (Krauss & Lee, 2003;Krauss & Sales, 2001, in a Texas death penalty case) or at least equally influenced (Guy & Edens, 2003, in a Texas sexual predator law case) by less scientifically valid clinical predictions of dangerousness when this less scientific method of assessing dangerousness was compared with more scientifically valid expert testimony. Unfortunately, the method by which different types of expert testimony may affect jury decisions is poorly understood and not well studied.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The effects of rational and experiential information processing of expert testimony in death penalty cases

Krauss

Lieberman

Olson

2004

Behavioral Sci & The Law

Self Cite

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Past research examining the effects of actuarial and clinical expert testimony on defendants' dangerousness in Texas death penalty sentencing has found that jurors are more influenced by less scientific pure clinical expert testimony and less influenced by more scientific actuarial expert testimony (Krauss & Lee, 2003; Krauss & Sales, 2001). By applying cognitive–experiential self‐theory (CEST) to juror decision‐making, the present study was undertaken in an attempt to offer a theoretical rationale for these findings. Based on past CEST research, 163 mock jurors were either directed into a rational mode or experiential mode of processing. Consistent with CEST and inconsistent with previous research using the same stimulus materials, results demonstrate that jurors in a rational mode of processing more heavily weighted actuarial expert testimony in their dangerousness assessments, while those jurors in the experiential condition were more influenced by clinical expert testimony. The policy implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Forensic Psychology, Public Policy, and the Law

Krauss

Sales

2003

Handbook of Psychology

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The authors explore critical points in the interaction between forensic practice and law and policy. Using forensic assessment and testimony as primary examples, the authors argue that changes in the law as well as forensic practice have transformed the responsibilities of both forensic practitioners and legal actors. The difficulties posed by these changes are discussed in the context of the new evidentiary admissibility requirements created by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Chemical (1993), and a number of dilemmas are raised that forensic practitioners, judges, and policy makers will face as a result of this new standard. Additionally, a number of central lessons that can be gleaned from the complex interaction of forensic psychology, law, and policy to date are highlighted and discussed. Finally, future directions for the field of forensic practice are also offered, including the role that forensic practitioners should play in shaping future policy and law.

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The effects of clinical and scientific expert testimony on juror decision making in capital sentencing.

Abstract: Future dangerousness of a criminal defendant is an important consideration in eight states' capital sentencing provisions, and in Oregon and Texas a finding of dangerousness is an essential requirement for the imposition of the death penalty (Worrell, 1987).

Cited by 128 publications

References 69 publications

Witness self‐efficacy: Development and validation of the construct

Witness self‐efficacy: Development and validation of the construct

The effects of rational and experiential information processing of expert testimony in death penalty cases

Forensic Psychology, Public Policy, and the Law

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