The Effects of Blaming Others for Legislative Inaction on Individual and Collective Evaluations

Abstract

Legislators commonly blame others for gridlock. We posit that legislators may engage in this type of rhetoric to minimize the individual reputational risks associated with legislative inaction or to boost the relative standing of their party. In a series of six survey experiments, we find that blaming others for inaction undermines voters’ evaluations of individual legislators who engage in this rhetorical strategy. This effect is particularly pronounced among out‐partisans and independents. However, blaming rhetoric can also enhance the standing of the blamer’s party relative to the opposing party across all groups (including out‐partisans), in large part by undermining the reputations of these other actors. Ultimately, we show that when an individual legislator engages in blaming rhetoric, the immediate net electoral effects are null. This suggests that coordinated efforts by a party to blame opponents may improve the party’s relative standing, while imposing few costs on those engaged in blaming.

Institutional Context and Accountability for Political Distrust

“…For example, when national conditions are poor, presidential candidates from the party out of power in the White House strategically emphasize presidential responsibility (Vavreck 2009), and evidence suggests that such rhetoric does affect responsibility attributions (Kane 2016). Conversely, congressional candidates from the party out of power in the legislative branch strategically blame problems on the party controlling Congress, and evidence shows that these messages are also effective (Best, Ladewig, and Wong 2013; Doherty and Harbridge-Yong 2020).…”