2014
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2397082
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The Effectiveness of Simple Homogeneous Commodity Procurement Under Rigid Govermental Regulation: The Case of Granulated Sugar Procurement in Russia

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Cited by 7 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…The overall price effect attributed to the use of e-auctions compared to standard open auctions is estimated to be 2.4% lower price than the originally estimated contract value. Another correlational study using a considerably larger sample from Russian sugar purchases in 2011 finds a considerably larger effect correlated with e-auction use of 28.0%-28.7% additional increase in discounts (Yakovlev et al, 2014). This corresponds to 5.8%-6.7% lower price per kilogram compared to the regional average price of sugar.…”
Section: B) Evidencementioning
confidence: 96%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The overall price effect attributed to the use of e-auctions compared to standard open auctions is estimated to be 2.4% lower price than the originally estimated contract value. Another correlational study using a considerably larger sample from Russian sugar purchases in 2011 finds a considerably larger effect correlated with e-auction use of 28.0%-28.7% additional increase in discounts (Yakovlev et al, 2014). This corresponds to 5.8%-6.7% lower price per kilogram compared to the regional average price of sugar.…”
Section: B) Evidencementioning
confidence: 96%
“…But similarly, a sophisticated corrupt network spanning through the public and private spheres could make sure a corrupt company wins with the lowest price while also guaranteeing a watering down of contractual conditions during contract execution. Third, corrupt politicians and bureaucrats may actually prefer a seemingly transparent and fair e-auction mechanism which lends them the appearance of integrity and allows them to shift blame should corruption be discovered (Yakovlev et al, 2014).…”
Section: E-procurement: E-auction and E-evaluation A) Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While there are not many high-quality studies about the effectiveness of e-auctions, there is some limited evidence on their positive effect on competition and lowering procurement prices (Yakovlev et al, 2014). A study by Pavel & Sičáková-Beblavá (2013) on Slovakian IT purchases suggests that the overall effect attributed to the use of e-auctions compared to standard open auctions is estimated to be a 2.4% price reduction compared to the originally estimated contract value.…”
Section: Widening Access To Public Contracts To Limit the Impact Of P...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Among many, advertising tenders in a widely used, free, online portal tends to lower prices, such as in Italian public works tenders where the effect size is 7% higher winning rebates (i.e. discounts compared to the reference price) (Coviello & Mariniello, 2014); or longer term, fixed price contracts are more expensive in Russian sugar purchases while larger volumes lead to lower unit prices (Andrey Yakovlev, Bashina, & Demidova, 2014).…”
Section: Indirectly Policy Influenceablementioning
confidence: 99%