“…Presidents also allocate these funds to punish political challengers (Fenwick & González, 2021), or, in the context of high levels of protest and economic constraint, to appease voters , through clientelism and political patronage (Calvo & Murillo, 2013; Fenwick & González, 2021, p. 288). For this latter group, an increase in the distribution of social programs is the result of intensified protests (Auyero, 2002; Calvo & Moscovich, 2017; Giraudy, 2007; Lodola, 2005; Weitz‐Shapiro, 2006), stronger social organizations (Anria & Niedzwiecki, 2016; Franceschelli & Ronconi, 2009; Garay, 2007), and stronger partisan links with them, even during Center‐Right governments (Niedzwiecki & Pribble, 2017). This literature makes valuable contributions, but we claim that it has two main shortcomings: first, it does not provide convincing accounts as to why protests influence the nature of the policy response—whether that demand will be fulfilled via programmatic (e.g., increasing the minimum wage) or discretionary spending (e.g., social subsidies) (Fenwick & González, 2021, p. 288).…”