The Effect of the Mandatory Adoption of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Executive Compensation

Chalevas, Constantinos

doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2011.04.004

Cited by 46 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 87 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Governance mechanism is formed to ensure that managers work primarily to produce advantages for shareholders by enhancing a firm's economic value. Regulatory authorities, in order tokeepthe interests of shareholders, have issuedsome corporate governance regulations [16]. In Indonesia, such CG regulations are Minister Regulation No.01/MBU/2011 about good corporate governance and The Indonesia Corporate Governance Manualwhich is released by Financial Service Authority in the year of 2014.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance and Firm’s Compliance on Disclosure of International Financial Reporting Standards–Indonesian Evidence

Krismiaji¹

2019

IJAFRM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper describes empirical research which investigateshow corporate governance (CG) affects the compliance level of disclosure for International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2013 and 2014, the two yearsafter full IFRS adoption. The CGis proxy by the board's structure, characteristics of an audit committee, and shares ownership structure, whereas IFRS disclosure's level of compliance is measured by disclosure index. This research uses ordinary least square to investigate the effect of corporate governance on the level of IFRS disclosurecompliance along with profitability, industry, and leverage as control variables. This research finds that five elements of CG characteristics which are board's independence, board's size, audit committee'sindependence, audit committee's size, and management's ownershippositively affect the level of IFRS disclosurecompliance. Yet, the block holder's ownership negatively affects the compliance level of IFRS disclosure, whereas government ownershipdoes not affect the compliance level of IFRS disclosure. This study provides additional evidence about the association of CG and the level of IFRS disclosure compliance by using Indonesian data. Furthermore, involvingfive elements of corporate governance mechanisms, this study provide additional finding about corporate governance comprehensively. Finally, this research provides values for all users of information including standard setters and other regulators to enhance reporting quality standards in Indonesia.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance and Firm’s Compliance on Disclosure of International Financial Reporting Standards–Indonesian Evidence

Krismiaji¹

2019

IJAFRM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Studies dedicated to corporate governance reveal variation in the degrees of voluntary disclosure among listed firms (Jallow et al, 2012;Samaha, Khlif, & Hussainey, 2015). On the basis of the evidence they reported, the primary determinants of the corporate governance disclosures in terms of level and quality are board characteristics and corporate governance disclosures (Chalevas, 2011).…”

Section: Determinants Of Voluntary Corporate Disclosurementioning

confidence: 99%

“…More specifically, with respect to the present study, the question as to which factors influence the compliance level with the JCGC 2010 involves the exploration of the factors that influence voluntary JCGC compliance. Corporate governance studies indicate that characteristics of board of directors and firm ownership structure primarily determine voluntary corporate governance disclosure (e.g., Chalevas, 2011;Samaha et al, 2012;Allegrini & Greco, 2013;Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). Accordingly, the top influential corporate governance and ownership variables are included in the present study for examination.…”

Section: Determinants Of Voluntary Corporate Disclosurementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Throughout the years, corporate governance regulations and academic studies have increasingly focused on independent boards and its importance (Chen & .Cheng, 2011;Johanson & \Ostergren, 2010). Based on the agency theory, independent boards are more capable of limiting opportunistic activities of management (Fama & Jensen, 1983), and they safeguard the rights of shareholders and minimize agency costs (Chalevas, 2011). The theory also posits that the existence of independent directors on the board can minimize information asymmetry ( Allegrini & Greco, 2013).…”

Section: Proportion Of Independent Directors and Voluntary Corporate mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Managerial ownership is important due to the significant role that the board of directors plays in corporate governance disclosure policies (Jensen & Meckling, 1976;Chalevas, 2011). Based on the perspective of agency theory, the managerial ownership-voluntary corporate disclosure relationship is still inconclusive (Haniff & Hudaib, 2006).…”

Section: Managerial Ownership and Voluntary Corporate Disclosurementioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure Innovative Evidence: The Case of Jordan

Almanasir

Shivaraj

2017

J. Rev. Global Econ.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper aimed to assess the corporate governance voluntary disclosure level and the impact of a set of corporate governances (CG) attributes on the level to which corporate governance voluntary disclosure is conducted in Jordan. Another objective was to determine if Jordanian industrial listed corporations adhere to and disclose good CG practices voluntarily, and if they do, to determine the factors influencing such disclosure. This study employed 61 industrial listed firms for the years 2010-2014. The research developed a general voluntary CG disclosure index composing of 15 Jordanian Corporate Governance Codes and gauged the relationship via pooled OLS and regression method. The results indicated that the proposed Jordanian Corporate Governance Index (JCGI) enhanced voluntary corporate governance disclosure among Jordanian listed firms over the examined years. They also showed varying levels of CG disclosures in different scenarios; 1) it is lower in firms with higher managerial ownership and 2) higher relative to the independent directors' proportion on the board, audit firm size, and audit committee presence with institutional ownership. Evidence on the compliance level towards the CG code in Amman Stock Exchange is unique and the study is distinct as it provides a pioneering evidence of the achieved compliance level.

show abstract

Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Developing Stock Exchange

Chalevas

Papadaki²,

Tzovas³

2022

Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Effect of the Mandatory Adoption of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Executive Compensation

Cited by 46 publications

References 87 publications

Corporate Governance and Firm’s Compliance on Disclosure of International Financial Reporting Standards–Indonesian Evidence

Corporate Governance and Firm’s Compliance on Disclosure of International Financial Reporting Standards–Indonesian Evidence

Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure Innovative Evidence: The Case of Jordan

Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Developing Stock Exchange

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About