The Effect of Temporary Contracts on Human Capital Accumulation in Chile

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis paper studies the probability of receiving employer-paid training and training independently of who finance it for permanent and temporary workers in Chile. We use data from the Social Protection Survey, EPS, which allow us to construct a panel of workers with information from 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2009. Our results suggest that having a temporary contract in Chile reduces the probability of receiving employer-paid training. We also find that this deficit is not compensated by other types of training. This finding is important for two reasons. First, the proportion of temporary workers that obtain an open-ended contract is low. Second, the productivity growth in Chile after 1997 is practically zero and human capital accumulation is one of the factors that might help to recover the path of productivity growth.

Un Análisis Dinámico De Los Flujos De Entrada a La Formalidad en América Latina

“…Este argumento es similar al esgrimido en el caso de los trabajadores temporarios, donde este tipo de ocupaciones serían un trampolín hacia una posición permanente(Booth et al, 2002;Zijl et al, 2009). Sin embargo, la evidencia no siempre confirma este argumento(Carpio et al, 2011). …”

Empleos para crecer

“…In the OECD, workers with temporary contracts have a 20% to 40% lower incidence of on-the-job training than those with indefinite contracts (Cabrales, Dolado, and Mora, 2014). In Chile, Carpio et al (2011) found that workers in temporary jobs in formal firms receive half the training that workers with indefinite contracts do. In Panama (see Figure 2.19), firms that make extensive use of temporary contracts tend to provide much less training.…”

“…154 probability of receiving specifi c on-the-job training in Spain was 22% lower for workers with temporary contracts than for those with indefi nite contracts. Carpio et al (2011) examine the effect of temporary contracts on human capital accumulation in Chile. Using panel data from the Social Protection Survey, they fi nd that workers with temporary contracts have a lower probability of receiving employer-fi nanced training and that this defi cit is not offset by other types of training.…”

“…Temporary contracts are issued to sidestep the regulations and labor costs associated with permanent hiring, and their use is increasingly widespread in the region (Carpio et al 2011;Meléndez and Pagés, 2011). Temporary contracts reduce the incentives to invest in training and may be responsible for part of the high labor turnover and unemployment volatility in times of crisis (see Box 5.1).…”

Dual labor markets and labor protection in an estimated search and matching model

“…In particular, they are associated with lower investment in human capital and productivity losses because the lack of attachment to the firm reduces the incentive of firms to invest in workers (Heckman and Pages, 2000). Empirically, Carpio et al (2011), in their analysis of the Chilean labor market, find that having a temporary contract reduces the probability of receiving employer-paid training. Dolado and Stucchi (2008) also find, for the case of Spain, evidence of an impact of temporary jobs on total productivity; however, their mechanism is different.…”