The effect of talent disparity on team productivity in soccer

Franck, Egon; Nüesch, Stephan

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2009.12.003

Cited by 72 publications

(57 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…We do not observe freeriding tendencies for workers who sorted into teams: Although we indeed observe lower average 1 While we analyze sorting between individual and team piece rates, Dohmen and Falk (2011) Franck and Nüesch (2010), who find talent disparity effects in soccer. 3 Of course, the diversification of idiosyncratic risks is also the main principle underlying insurance.…”

mentioning

confidence: 62%

Risk-sorting and preference for team piece rates

Bäker¹,

Mertins²

2013

Journal of Economic Psychology

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract Incentive schemes not only influence the effort provision of workers, but might also induce sorting. As drivers of self-selection, the literature mainly focuses on measures of productivity; however, other variables, such as preferences, beliefs and personality, also play a role. With this paper, we contribute to the literature on drivers of self-selection by analyzing the role of perceived wage risks as potential influences on the sorting decision. To this end, we study a sorting decision between two variable compensation systems, where both options carry wage risks. Specifically, we look at sorting between individual piece rates and team piece rates. Terms of use: Documents inUsing experimental data, we find evidence for both risk diversification considerations and free-riding concerns (i.e., risk of teaming-up with low-productive teammates) as drivers of self-selection. However, our data does not support the concern of our experimental subjects that others actually reduce their effort when working under team compensation, as compared to individual-based compensation.

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confidence: 62%

Risk-sorting and preference for team piece rates

Bäker¹,

Mertins²

2013

Journal of Economic Psychology

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“…Baseball, and Franck and Nüesch (2010) in the case of German professional soccer -and routinized factory production (Hamilton et al, 2003). However, these models may be less applicable in business environments where performance depends on the outputs of multiple tasks.…”

Section: In the Case Of Major Leaguementioning

confidence: 99%

“…4 Moreover, our main interest is in the exogenous variation in cognitive ability rather than the exact level of test scores. Consistent with recent empirical studies involving professional sports (Franck and Nüesch, 2010;Papps et al, 2011), we use the coe cient of Panel B shows the numbers of students and teams by field of study. It also indicates that (the range of) average ability and ability dispersion of teams are similar across fields of study; possibly except for the field of financial management which accommodates only two teams.…”

Section: Cognitive Abilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Ability Dispersion and Team Performance

Hoogendoorn¹,

Parker²,

Praag³

2014

AMPROC

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“…1 These arguments have been applied to explain performance in team sports, for example, Gould and Winter (2009) in the case of Major League Baseball, and Franck and Nüesch (2010) in the case of German professional soccer. Other reasons why teams might benet from heterogeneity in ability among their members include the imposition of valuable high team production norms by a few powerful able members and learning by less able from more able team members (Hamilton et al, 2003).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%