The effect of situational meaning on the behaviour of subjects in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Eiser, J. Richard; Bhavnani, Kum‐Kum

doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420040108

Cited by 46 publications

(29 citation statements)

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“…As Eiser and Bhavnani (1974) showed, individuals' behaviour in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game varied depending upon the context in which the conflict was defined. When conflict was presented as a game or as a bargaining, economic type of situation it caused much lower cooperation than when it was described as a simulation of interpersonal or international conflict.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Numerical trap’. A new look at outcome representation in studies on choice behaviour

Grzelak

Poppe

Czwartosz

et al. 1988

Euro J Social Psych

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Numerical trap’. A new look at outcome representation in studies on choice behaviour

Grzelak

Poppe

Czwartosz

et al. 1988

Euro J Social Psych

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“…40 People express less 12 self-regarding preferences in games framed in social contexts than in games framed in market contexts. 41 The cooperative disposition of an agent is also connected with the question of whether the agent conceptualizes a given situation in terms of an "I"-frame of self-interest, or a "we"-frame of collective interest. 42 Experimental conditions as undemanding as asking subjects to edit a text by circling all occurrences of "we", "us" and "our" have been shown to induce use of the "we"-frame.…”

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confidence: 99%

Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation

Dryzek

List²

2002

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

322

193

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This is an electronic version of anNuffield College in 1998, and Dryzek thanks the College for its hospitality. For helpful comments, we thank Keith Dowding, James Fishkin, Natalie Gold, Robert Goodin, Iain McLean, Gerry Mackie, David Miller, Claus Offe, Anne Sliwka, the editor, and the anonymous reviewers of this paper.2 Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy:A Reconciliation AbstractThe two most influential traditions of contemporary theorizing about democracy, social choice theory and deliberative democracy, are generally thought to be at loggerheads, in that the former demonstrates the impossibility, instability or meaninglessness of the rational collective outcomes sought by the latter. We argue that the two traditions can be reconciled.After expounding the central Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility results, we reassess their implications, identifying the conditions under which meaningful democratic decision making is possible. We argue that deliberation can promote these conditions, and hence that social choice theory suggests not that democratic decision making is impossible, but rather that democracy must have a deliberative aspect. Two Traditions of Democratic TheoryIn the past decade the theory of democracy has been dominated by two very different approaches. Within democratic theory as conventionally defined the strongest current is now deliberative. 1 For deliberative democrats, the essence of democratic legitimacy is the capacity of those affected by a collective decision to deliberate in the production of that decision. Deliberation involves discussion in which individuals are amenable to scrutinizing and changing their preferences in light of persuasion (but not manipulation, deception, or coercion) from other participants. Claims for and against courses of action must be justified to others in terms they can accept. Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, respectively the most influential continental and Anglo-American political philosophers of the late 20 th century, have both identified themselves as deliberative democrats. 2 Deliberative democrats are uniformly optimistic that deliberation yields rational collective outcomes.The main competing tradition is social choice theory, whose proponents generally deduce far less optimistic results. To social choice theorists, the democratic problem involves aggregation of views, interests, or preferences across individuals, not deliberation over their content. From the seminal work of Kenneth Arrow on, it has been argued that such aggregation is bedeviled by impossibility, instability and arbitrariness. 3 Arrow proved the non-existence of any aggregation mechanism satisfying a set of seemingly innocuous conditions. This critique of democracy was radicalized by William Riker, who argued that any notion of a popular will independent of the mechanism used to aggregate preferences was untenable. 4 Given that there is no good reason to choose any particular mechanism over any other, supposedly democratic collective choices are arbitrary, and dem...

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“…The presentation of a decision problem can affect the way a person interprets and responds to it (Tversky & Khaneman, 1981), and the interpretive frame of a problem can affect strategies that decision makers use (Ormerod, Manktelow, Robson, & Steward, 1986;Bacharach, 1994) and the decisions that they make (for example, Eiser & Bhavnani, 1974;Tversky & Khaneman,;Levin & Gaeth, 1988;Manktelow & Over, 1991), even if the structure of the problem remains unchanged. In our study, the reasons that participants gave for their preferences often indicated conscious considerations of the context or frame, although some of their reasons, such as a desire for equality, appeared to transcend the contextual framing of the vignettes and may therefore have been context-free.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective Preferences in Strategic Decisions

Rose

Colman

2007

Psychol Rep

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Summary.-In the theories of team reasoning of Sugden, and Bacharach, players are assumed to be motivated in some circumstances to maximize collective rather than individual utilities. An experiment was performed to asses whether preferences underlying such collective payoff maximization occur. An opportunistic sample of 50 undergraduate and graduate students, 7 men and 43 women aged 19 to 42 years (M = 23.0, SD = 5.4), expressed preferences among the outcomes of strategic decisions presented in vignettes designed to engage social value orientations of individualism, altruism, competitiveness, equality seeking, or collective preferences. In the vignettes designed to engage collective preferences, and significantly less frequently in the other vignettes, preferences were biased toward outcomes maximizing collective payoffs, and respondents invariably gave team-reasoning explanations for their preferences. These results provide evidence for collective preferences according to theories of team reasoning and empirical support for one of the essential assumptions of these theories.

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The effect of situational meaning on the behaviour of subjects in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Cited by 46 publications

References 5 publications

‘Numerical trap’. A new look at outcome representation in studies on choice behaviour

‘Numerical trap’. A new look at outcome representation in studies on choice behaviour

Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation

Collective Preferences in Strategic Decisions

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