2015
DOI: 10.17287/kmr.2015.44.2.459
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The Effect of Real Earnings Management and Corporate Governance on CEO Compensation

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…On average, the return on assets (ROA) of the current fiscal year is 1.1%. by CEO type, the signs on the correlation match that of prior studies that look at earnings management and the determinants of loss avoidance (Kim et al, 2009;Jung & Kim, 2014;Park et al, 2015).…”
Section: Descriptive Statisticssupporting
confidence: 72%
“…On average, the return on assets (ROA) of the current fiscal year is 1.1%. by CEO type, the signs on the correlation match that of prior studies that look at earnings management and the determinants of loss avoidance (Kim et al, 2009;Jung & Kim, 2014;Park et al, 2015).…”
Section: Descriptive Statisticssupporting
confidence: 72%
“…In relation to this, Sims and Sunley (1992) and Guenther (1994) found that managers used a tax strategy to minimize their corporate tax by deferring the profits generated in the year just before TRA86 was implemented to the next year or by lowering their profits. Additionally, Kim, Lee, and Choi (2014) conducted an empirical analysis of Korean listed companies from 2003 to 2011 considering the year of a corporate tax rate cut. It was argued that the sensitivity was increased; these results were interpreted as meaning that managers who intentionally lowered profits in the year prior to the corporate tax rate cut would receive relatively high compensation for the same performance.…”
Section: Review Of the Literature And Research Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…또한, (Lee et al, 2012;Choi et al, 2012). 또한 기업지배구조가 우수한 기업의 경우 경영자의 이익조정행위에 대해 경영자 보상에 불이익을 주는 것으로 나타나 우수한 기업지배구조가 실질적으로 경영자의 보상을 모니터링하고 있는 것으로 나타났다 (Kim et al, 2015). Yun and Lee(2017) (Anderson et al, 2003) (5)는 다음과 같다.…”
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