The Effect of Power Asymmetries on Cooperation and Punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

Bone, Jonathan E.; Wallace, Brian; Bshary, Redouan; Raihani, Nichola

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117183

Cited by 32 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…This was a deliberate choice which allowed us to cleanly study the use of punishment and gossip by high-versus low-power participants. Nevertheless, using an exogenous power manipulation might be one reason for the discrepancy between our findings and those of other studies on power and cooperation (e.g., studies varying the endowment size available to participants or punishment power [42,43]). Future work could directly test whether endogenous and exogenous power manipulations differentially affect cooperation and strategies to promote cooperation.…”

Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 99%

Hierarchy, Power, and Strategies to Promote Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Molho

Balliet

2019

Games

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Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. How, then, is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.

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Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 99%

Hierarchy, Power, and Strategies to Promote Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Molho

Balliet

2019

Games

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“…141-142). Interestingly, the finding above was partly mirrored in a recent paper on punishment heterogeneity that found weak players were less likely to receive retaliation from stronger players (Bone, Wallace, Bshary, & Raihani, 2015), although here strong players were retaliated against by both player types. Additionally, while the framing of the belligerents as teammates could make retaliation unlikely, in real-life situations similar to the scenario, the opposite is true (Levine, Lowe, Best, & Heim, 2012).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 56%

Who Punishes? The Status of the Punishers Affects the Perceived Success of, and Indirect Benefits From, “Moralistic” Punishment

Gordon

Lea

2016

Evol Psychol

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''Moralistic'' punishment of free riders can provide a beneficial reputation, but the immediate behavior is costly to the punisher. In Study 1, we investigated whether variation in status would be perceived to offset or mitigate the costs of punishment. One hundred and nineteen participants were presented with a vignette describing a punishment scenario. Participants predicted whether punishment would occur, how successful it would be, and indicated their attitude to the punisher. Participants believed only intervention by a high-status (HS) individual would be successful and that low-status (LS) individuals would not intervene at all. HS individuals predicted to punish successfully were seen as more formidable and likable. Study 2 investigated whether punishment was necessary to maintain an HS position. One hundred and seventeen participants were presented with a vignette describing a punishment scenario. Participants were asked to indicate whether they wished to be led by the punisher. HS individuals who did not punish were less likely to be chosen as leaders compared to HS punishers, whereas LS individuals who punished were no more or less likely to be chosen than nonpunishers. The results of both studies suggest that only HS individuals are expected to punish, likely because such a position offsets some of the costs of punishment. As a result, only HS individual can access the reputation benefits from punishment. Furthermore, an HS position may be dependent on the willingness to punish antisocial behavior. The ramifications that these results may have for the evolution of moralistic punishment are discussed.

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“…Punishment that creates advantageous inequality in the punisher's favor might be interpreted as a competitive act and therefore perceived as morally illegitimate. Punishment that creates advantageous inequality in favor of the punisher might therefore be unlikely to deter further defection (Bone et al, 2015;Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003;Xiao, 2013) and may even provoke retaliation from the target (Bone et al, 2015). Whilst we stress that this explanation is speculative it offers promising avenues for further studies to explore the scenarios that motivate punishment.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 84%

“…Indeed, under real-world settings, the fee-to-fine ratio of punishment is likely to vary with relative dominance status of individuals (e.g. Bone, Wallace, Bshary, & Raihani, 2015;Raihani et al, 2012). Clearly, more studies of punishment in real-world settings are needed to establish how punishment use varies according to whether interactions are repeated or not;…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human punishment is motivated by both a desire for revenge and a desire for equality

Bone

Raihani

2015

Evolution and Human Behavior

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Humans willingly pay a cost to punish defecting partners in experimental games. However, the psychological motives underpinning punishment are unclear. Punishment could stem from the desire to reciprocally harm a cheat (i.e. revenge) which is arguably indicative of a deterrent function. Alternatively, punishment could be motivated by the desire to redress the balance between punisher and cheat. Such a desire for equality might be more indicative of a fitness-leveling function. We used a two player experimental game to disentangle these two possibilities. In this game, one player could choose to steal $0.20 from their partner. Depending on the treatment, players interacting with a stealing partner experienced either advantageous inequality, equal outcomes or disadvantageous inequality. Players could punish stealing partners but some players had access to effective punishment (1 : 3 fee to fine) whereas others could only use ineffective punishment (1 : 1). Players who had access to effective punishment could reduce disadvantageous inequality by tailoring their investment in punishment whereas ineffective punishment did not change the relative payoffs of the individuals in the game but could be used to exact revenge. Players punished regardless of whether stealing created outcome inequality or whether punishment was ineffective at removing payoff differentials, suggesting that punishment was at least partly motivated by the desire to inflict reciprocal harm. However, in the effective punishment condition, players' tendency to punish increased if stealing resulted in disadvantageous inequality and, when possible, punishers tailored their investment in punishment to create equal outcomes. Together these findings suggest that punishment is motivated by both a desire for revenge and a desire for equality. The implications of these findings are discussed.

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The Effect of Power Asymmetries on Cooperation and Punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

Cited by 32 publications

References 59 publications

Hierarchy, Power, and Strategies to Promote Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Hierarchy, Power, and Strategies to Promote Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Who Punishes? The Status of the Punishers Affects the Perceived Success of, and Indirect Benefits From, “Moralistic” Punishment

Human punishment is motivated by both a desire for revenge and a desire for equality

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