The effect of job rotation policy in preventing managerial escalation of commitment

Chong, Vincent K.; Suryawati, Rindah Febriana

doi:10.1504/ijaape.2011.040833

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…The participants have also been applied to previous studies (Harrison & Harrell, 1993;Rutledge & Karim, 1999;Cheng, et al, 2003;Chong & Suryawati, 2010;Dewi & Supriyadi, 2012). The independent variables in this article are 2 (two), namely: adverse selection which is a condition…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The adverse selection problem arises when managers have private information (for example, information about projections of future project performance) and incentive to shirk or act in their own interests at the expense of principal interests (Chong & Suryawati, 2010). When these two conditions exist, agent can look irrational from the principal's point of view (such as continuing an unfavorable project) but rational according to the agent (Harrison & Harrell, 1993).…”

Section: Developing Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The increasing escalation of manager's commitment brings losses to the company. Therefore, a method is badly needed to reduce the escalation of commitment (Gosh, 1997;McNamara, Moon, & Bromiley, 2002;Cheng, et al, 2003;Chong & Suryawati, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hurdle Rate and Adverse Selection on Escalation of Commitment

Ridha

2019

Shirkah

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This article tests the effect of hurdle rates and adverse selection on escalation of commitment. Participants consist of 135 junior managers who had passed two course of management. The result indicates that the managers with adverse selection conditions will tend not to continue unfavorable projects. This research also affirms that the managers with adverse selection conditions will be more likely not to continue projects that are not favorable under the conditions of self-set hurdle rates compared to the conditions of organization-set hurdle rates. This article may contribute to empirical evidence of a decline in comprehensive escalation of commitments. Keywords: adverse selection, self-set hurdle rates, organization-set hurdle rates, escalation of commitment

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Developing Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%