The Effect of IMU Accuracy on Dual-antenna GNSS Spoofing Detection

Liu, Yang; Fu, Qiangwen; Li, Sihai; Xiao, Xiangning

doi:10.33012/2016.13400

Cited by 2 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…The expression b T PS i should be recognized as the inner product between vectors S i and b. When the attitude of the dual-antenna array is determined by INS [23], b T PS i can be converted to the scalar form ∥b∥ cos i , where i denotes the incidence angle of satellite i in the body frame, as shown in Figure 2. Then, we have…”

Section: Dual-antenna Carrier Phase Double Differencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…where γ ij = γ i − γ j . With or without INS aiding, the dual-antenna carrier phase double difference in ( 5) is always the basis for numerous spoofing detection methods [6], [23], [24], [25]. However, as shown in Figure 3, when the signals incident from the cone surface to the dual-antennas A and B, there are almost identical carrier phase differences computed from (4).…”

Section: Dual-antenna Carrier Phase Double Differencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some of the proposed GNSS-INS spoofing detection methods are as follows: receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) based anti-spoofing [20], platform relative motion estimation results comparison method [21], and integrated navigation residuals monitoring method [22]. Meanwhile, the spoofing detection method proposed in [23], [24], and [25] combines DOA method and INS-aided method in a dual-antenna receiver to detect the spoofing signals based on carrier phase double differenced measurements [26], which needs no modifications on the receiver or antennas configuration. It is a very promising GNSS-INS consistent spoofing detection method.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Comparing the DOA of calculated signal with the corresponding signal obtained by the multi-antenna receiver through the carrier phase double-differences, a hypothesis test procedure is implemented to discriminate the spoofing. Different from the current INS-aided dual-antenna receiver spoofing detection methods [23], [24], [25], the nonlinear multi-antennas array receiver can eliminate the spatial ambiguity DOA. Eventually, comprehensively analysis on the corresponding detection performance is conducted by simulated experiments, which are the main contribution of this paper.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

INS-Aided Multi-Antenna GNSS Carrier Phase Double Difference Spoofing Detection

Zhang¹,

Ding²,

Xia³

et al. 2023

IEEE Access

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The effective spoofing detection can prevent GNSS receiver from providing erroneous positioning, velocity and timing information. Most of the available multi-antennas carrier phase double differencebased spoofing detection methods, regardless of the aiding of inertial navigation system (INS), exploit the divergence in carrier phase double differences derived from the direction of arrival (DOA) characteristics of the authentic signal and spoofing signal. However, the traditional methods mainly implemented by dualantenna GNSS receivers has spatial ambiguity and lacks global detection performance analysis. Furthermore, an INS-aided multi-antenna spoofing detection method is proposed without spatial ambiguity comparing the predicted signal DOA by INS and the vectoral carrier phase double differences measured by multi antennas. To analyze the influence of the antenna array baseline length and signal DOA on the detection performance, a comprehensive numerical simulation was conducted. The dead zone of the proposed detection method is revealed to assess the global spoofing detection performance. The effectiveness of the proposed method is verified under the GNSS positioning scenarios. In the worst case, spoofing signals can be effectively detected in 95.2% of the airspace under one time the wavelength antenna baseline configuration and in 99.3% of the airspace under five times the wavelength antenna baseline configuration, respectively.INDEX TERMS Inertial navigation system aiding, GNSS spoofing detection, carrier phase, multi-antenna.

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Section: Dual-antenna Carrier Phase Double Differencementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Dual-antenna Carrier Phase Double Differencementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

INS-Aided Multi-Antenna GNSS Carrier Phase Double Difference Spoofing Detection

Zhang¹,

Ding²,

Xia³

et al. 2023

IEEE Access

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…With dual antennas, GNSS is able to measure the vehicle heading. The consistency of attitudes resolved by INS and GNSS is able to detect spoofing attacks, due to the difference from the spoofing heading to the actual heading [25,26].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance Analysis of GNSS/INS Loosely Coupled Integration Systems under Spoofing Attacks

Ding

et al. 2018

Sensors

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The loosely coupled integration of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and Inertial Navigation System (INS) have been widely used to improve the accuracy, robustness and continuity of navigation services. However, the integration systems possibly affected by spoofing attacks, since integration algorithms without spoofing detection would feed autonomous INSs with incorrect compensations from the spoofed GNSSs. This paper theoretically analyzes and tests the performances of GNSS/INS loosely coupled integration systems with the classical position fusion and position/velocity fusion under typical meaconing (MEAC) and lift-of-aligned (LOA) spoofing attacks. Results show that the compensations of Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) errors significantly increase under spoofing attacks. The compensations refer to the physical features of IMUs and their unreasonable increments likely result from the spoofing-induced inconsistency of INS and GNSS measurements. Specially, under MEAC attacks, the IMU error compensations in both the position-fusion-based system and position/velocity-fusion-based system increase obviously. Under LOA attacks, the unreasonable compensation increments are found from the position/velocity-fusion-based integration system. Then a detection method based on IMU error compensations is tested and the results show that, for the position/velocity-fusion-based integration system, it can detect both MEAC and LOA attacks with high probability using the IMU error compensations.

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The Effect of IMU Accuracy on Dual-antenna GNSS Spoofing Detection

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

INS-Aided Multi-Antenna GNSS Carrier Phase Double Difference Spoofing Detection

INS-Aided Multi-Antenna GNSS Carrier Phase Double Difference Spoofing Detection

Performance Analysis of GNSS/INS Loosely Coupled Integration Systems under Spoofing Attacks

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