The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting

Gersbach, Hans; Mamageishvili, Akaki; Tejada, Oriol

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2021.105228

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…From the proof of Theorem 1 and by taking δ = 1, we obtain the lower bound threshold on f * (c) for vote delegation, above which no well-behaving voter votes. We can compare this to the corresponding threshold for conventional voting that has been derived in Gersbach et al (2019). This leads to the following proposition.…”

Section: Comparisonsmentioning

confidence: 91%

Vote Delegation and Malicious Parties

Gersbach¹,

Mamageishvili

Schneider

2020

2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)

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We study vote delegation with "well-behaving" and "misbehaving" agents and compare it with conventional voting. Typical examples are validation or governance tasks on blockchains. There is a majority of well-behaving agents, but since voting is costly, they may want to abstain or delegate their vote to other agents. Misbehaving agents always vote. We compare conventional voting allowing for abstention with vote delegation. Preferences of voters are private information and a positive outcome is achieved if well-behaving voters win. We provide three insights: First, if the number of misbehaving voters, denoted by #X, is high, both voting methods fail to deliver a positive outcome. Second, if #X is moderate, conventional voting delivers a positive outcome, while vote delegation fails with probability one. Third, if #X is low, delegation delivers a positive outcome with a higher probability than conventional voting. Finally, our results allow us assessing the performance of vote delegation which is known as "liquid democracy".

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Section: Comparisonsmentioning

confidence: 91%

Vote Delegation and Malicious Parties

Gersbach¹,

Mamageishvili

Schneider

2020

2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)

Self Cite

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“…Recently this idea gained popularity (Dowlen, 2017;Cheng, Dughmi, & Kempe, 2017Guerrero, 2014) for its fairness, representativness, high barriers to various manipulations 6 including vote-buying (Walsh & Xia, 2012;Parkes, Tylkin, & Xia, 2017;Jamroga, Roenne, Ryan, & Stark, 2019;Gersbach, Mamageishvili, & Tejada, 2017), and stronger incentives to learn which alternative is the best compared to all-population referendum (Gersbach, Mamageishvili, Tejada, et al, 2020). As shown by Gersbach, Mamageishvili, and Tejada (2021), hybrid procedures including sortition as one of the steps can increase the incentives for the population to participate in the election. Trustworthy and secure implementation of sortition in practice leads to cryptographic challenges (Eastlake, 2004;Lenstra & Wesolowski, 2015;Basin, Radomirovic, & Schmid, 2018).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Representative Committees of Peers

Meir¹,

Sandomirskiy

Tennenholtz³

2021

jair

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A population of voters must elect representatives among themselves to decide on a sequence of possibly unforeseen binary issues. Voters care only about the final decision, not the elected representatives. The disutility of a voter is proportional to the fraction of issues, where his preferences disagree with the decision. While an issue-by-issue vote by all voters would maximize social welfare, we are interested in how well the preferences of the population can be approximated by a small committee. We show that a k-sortition (a random committee of k voters with the majority vote within the committee) leads to an outcome within the factor 1+O(1/√ k) of the optimal social cost for any number of voters n, any number of issues m, and any preference profile. For a small number of issues m, the social cost can be made even closer to optimal by delegation procedures that weigh committee members according to their number of followers. However, for large m, we demonstrate that the k-sortition is the worst-case optimal rule within a broad family of committee-based rules that take into account metric information about the preference profile of the whole population.

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“…Our idea is to find solutions in which the Tech Giants and users play an active part. We develop new collective decision procedures that can be used for experimenting, and our monitoring problem with the Tech Giants would be an ideal field of experimentation (Gersbach et al 2019;Gersbach 2017).…”

Section: What To Do?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, for issues of highest importance, one could imagine that the entire pool of users should have a say. For such cases, one could use Assessment Voting (see Gersbach et al 2019). Under such voting procedures, once the Assessment Group has made a decision and the decision has been made public, the entire pool of users would have a chance to vote, either confirming the Assessment Group's decision by abstaining, reinforcing the result, or overturning the Assessment Group's outcome.…”

Section: Solution: Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%