2024
DOI: 10.3390/risks12040059
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The Effect of Corporate Governance on the Degree of Agency Cost in the Korean Market

Younghwan Lee,
Ana Belén Tulcanaza-Prieto

Abstract: This study examines the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and agency costs using Korean market data, particularly for chaebol firms. The final sample includes 660 firm-year observations between 2016 and 2020 for Korean non-financial firms listed on the Korean Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI). This study employs an ordinary least-squares panel data regression model using two proxies for agency costs, namely, asset utilization ratio and operating expense ratio, and six CG individual metrics as in… Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…The agency theory posits that the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations can lead to conflicts of interest between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) (Jensen and Meckling 2019). This controversy exists as a result of a conflict of interest and arises when agents abuse their job roles and power to maximize their self-interests at the expense of the shareholders and thus increase agency costs (Lee and Tulcanaza-Prieto 2024). The study by Osei-Baidoo et al (2023) examined how certain corporate governance attributes, such as board diversity, board size, and CEO duality, can help mitigate agency problems and enhance bank performance.…”
Section: Agency Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The agency theory posits that the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations can lead to conflicts of interest between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) (Jensen and Meckling 2019). This controversy exists as a result of a conflict of interest and arises when agents abuse their job roles and power to maximize their self-interests at the expense of the shareholders and thus increase agency costs (Lee and Tulcanaza-Prieto 2024). The study by Osei-Baidoo et al (2023) examined how certain corporate governance attributes, such as board diversity, board size, and CEO duality, can help mitigate agency problems and enhance bank performance.…”
Section: Agency Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%