The ECOWAS Intervention in the Gambia - 2017

Helal, Mohamed S.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3046628

Cited by 2 publications

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“…415 One must query, though, not only the generality of the consent underpinning this appeal, issued as it was to the international community as a whole, but also its timing, coming as it did when President Barrow 'exercised no control, whether effective or otherwise, over The Gambia'. 416 Still, the considerations of 'the will of the Gambian people and therefore their right to self-determination', as well as 'respect for democracy', have been taken as shoring up the validity of the intervention by virtue of that invitation. 417 Significantly, however, this approach will invariably mean the relaxing of requirements for solicited interventions when undertaken in such circumstances.…”

Section: Pro-democratic Interventionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intervention and the Problematisation of Consent

Kritsiotis

2023

Armed Intervention and Consent

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and the United Kingdom followed. 1 For his part, President Maduro regarded these developments as a 'gringo coup' inspired by the United States, which he was determined to repel. 2 He responded by closing the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington D.C.; Guaido ´, in turn, appointed Carlos A. Vecchio as 'Ambassador of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United States of America'. 3 * I am indebted to my two interlocutors in this enterprise -Olivier Corten and Greg Fox -as I am to Erika de Wet and to Achilles Skordas for their detailed engagement with an earlier version of this chapter. My warm appreciation must also be expressed to Anne Peters and to Christian Marxsen, both of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg, for their very kind invitation to participate in this fourth Trialogue in the series.

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Section: Pro-democratic Interventionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intervention and the Problematisation of Consent

Kritsiotis

2023

Armed Intervention and Consent

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“…A second difficulty raised by Operation 'Restore Democracy' is that of the fragile -to say the least -authority of the person who issued the invitation, Adama Barrow. 272 He became president only after hastily swearing the oath in Senegalese territory. 273 It is difficult to state an opinion on the legality of this act under Gambian law, but one cannot help harbouring a few doubts 274 particularly as another oath was later sworn on 18 February 2017, in the capital Banjul, at the national festival celebration.…”

Section: Problems Raised By the Invocation Of Intervention By Invitat...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Intervention by Invitation

Corten

2023

Armed Intervention and Consent

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At first sight, securing consent for outside military operations is an attractive argument inasmuch as it appears to make such interventions incontrovertibly lawful. As the text of Article 2(4) of the 1945 Charter of the United Nations indicates, the prohibition of the use of force relates only to military interventions conducted by one state against another state. 1 If we argue a contrario, an operation conducted with the consent of the state in question is not prohibited under the Charter insofar as it is not an infringement on any state's political independence or sovereignty. 2 Accordingly, there would be no need for one state to justify or excuse any such intervention at the invitation of another state. Under the classical conception of international law, a state is represented by its government, and if that government invites another state to intervene in its territory, then such action is in the area of cooperation. 3 The effects of consent are therefore decisive: they tip the situation out of the domain of the use of force and into the domain of friendly relations.The existence of an invitation may also make it possible to escape the intricate debates that beset other aspects of ius contra bellum. This is a familiar point. For example, controversy has arisen -especially in recent years -over the possibility of invoking self-defence when interpreting the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter with respect to non-state groups. 1The ´odore Christakis and Karine Bannelier, 'Volenti non fit injuria? Les effets du consentement a `l'intervention militaire', Annuaire franc ¸ais de droit international 50 (2004), 102-37 (112-13). 2 James Crawford, Second Report on State Responsibility, 30 April 1999, UN Doc. A/CN.4/498/ Add.2, 12-13, para. 240(b). 3 See, e.g., UN Security Council (UN SC) Resolution 387 of 31 March 1976, recalling 'the inherent and lawful right of every State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to request assistance from any other State or group of States'.

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The ECOWAS Intervention in the Gambia - 2017

Cited by 2 publications

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Intervention and the Problematisation of Consent

Intervention and the Problematisation of Consent

Intervention by Invitation

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