The economy, corruption, and the vote: Evidence from experiments in Sweden and Moldova

Klašnja, Marko; Tucker, Joshua A.

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.05.007

Cited by 129 publications

(120 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Consequently, a politician can offset, at least partially, the negative impact of his/her corruptness by transferring government benefits to his/her constituents, supporting economic policies with which they agree and/or governing competently otherwise. Indeed Klasnja and Tucker (2013) find that whereas in a low corruption country, voters react negatively to corruption regardless of the state of the economy, in a high corruption country, voters react negatively to corruption only when the state of the economy is also poor; when economic conditions are good, corruption is less important. Thus corrupt incumbents may lose votes but not enough to deny them reelection, as long as they keep the level of corruption in check and do not allow it to damage overall economic performance significantly.…”

Section: Review Of Corruption Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Voter reaction to government incompetence and corruption related to the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey

Akarca

Tansel

2016

Journal of Economic Studies

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. licence. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.IZA Discussion Paper No. 9162 June 2015 ABSTRACT Voter Reaction to Government Incompetence and Corruption Related to the 1999 Earthquakes in Turkey *Two major earthquakes which struck northwestern Turkey in 1999 exposed rampant corruption involving construction and zoning code violations. The government's relief efforts were tainted by corruption as well, and exhibited a great deal of incompetence. How voters responded to these in the next election held in 2002 is investigated. The fact that different group of parties were responsible for the construction of the shoddy buildings, and for the corruption and mismanagement related to relief, provided us with a unique opportunity to determine whether and how the electorate punished the culprits for each of these. Vote equations are estimated for the seven major political parties. These are fitted to crossprovincial data individually, using OLS, Robust Regression methods, and Seemingly Unrelated Regressions procedures. The same picture emerg...

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Section: Review Of Corruption Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Voter reaction to government incompetence and corruption related to the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey

Akarca

Tansel

2016

Journal of Economic Studies

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“…Second, corruption is also widely considered one of the more salient issues affecting voters' considerations when evaluating incumbent performance (Welch and Hibbing 1997;Anderson and Tverdova 2003;Krause and Méndez 2009;Klašnja and Tucker 2013). Regarding country specific studies of corruption voting, Welch and Hibbing (1997) found that, in general, there was a negative relationship between charges of corruption against an incumbent and that incumbent's share of the vote in U.S. congressional elections.…”

Section: The Economy Corruption and Conditional Voting Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They found that a voter's intention to vote for a particular party decreased according to the increase in his/her perception of how corrupt was that party. On the other hand, Klašnja and Tucker (2013) examined corruption voting under two different conditional circumstances: the level of corruption and the state of the economy. By comparing a highly corrupt country (Moldova) to a less corrupt country, Klašnja and Tucker (2013) found that voters punished incumbents for corruption regardless of the state of the economy in a low corruption country, whereas voters punished incumbents for corruption only when the state of the economy was also poor in a high corruption country.…”

Section: The Economy Corruption and Conditional Voting Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, Klašnja and Tucker (2013) examined corruption voting under two different conditional circumstances: the level of corruption and the state of the economy. By comparing a highly corrupt country (Moldova) to a less corrupt country, Klašnja and Tucker (2013) found that voters punished incumbents for corruption regardless of the state of the economy in a low corruption country, whereas voters punished incumbents for corruption only when the state of the economy was also poor in a high corruption country. In turn, Krause and Méndez (2009) recently conducted research on the relationship between corruption and the incumbent vote share across countries.…”

Section: The Economy Corruption and Conditional Voting Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, many studies have found that voters punished candidates accused of corruption (Peters and Welch 1980;Fackler and Lin 1995;Chang and Golden 2004;Slomczynski and Shabad 2011;Klašnja and Tucker 2013), so that an increase in the level of government party corruption caused a loss in its vote share (Krause and Méndez 2009).…”

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confidence: 99%

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The Economy, Corruption, and Conditional Voting : A Cross-National Analysis

Shin¹

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Corruption and Electoral Accountability: Avenues for Future Research

Vries

Solaz

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The vast majority of people across the globe lives in countries characterized by high levels of corruption, commonly defined as the public misuse of private gains. Although the exact costs of corruption are difficult to estimate, research suggests that corruption is bad for economic and social development. Not only has corruption been shown to have a detrimental effect on a country's economy, the ability to generate tax revenue and social equality, the political effects of corruption are also considerable. Owing to its association with weak state capacity, corruption may damage the ability of governments to craft and implement policies in areas in which continued intervention and investment is needed and their capacity to respond quickly and effectively to sudden shocks. Owing to these undesirable outcomes, elections are supposed to curb corruption because voters will throw the rascals out. Recent research, however, suggests that more often than not corruption goes unpunished at the ballot box. This essay sets out possible research avenues to find out why this is the case.

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The economy, corruption, and the vote: Evidence from experiments in Sweden and Moldova

Cited by 129 publications

References 26 publications

Voter reaction to government incompetence and corruption related to the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey

Voter reaction to government incompetence and corruption related to the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey

The Economy, Corruption, and Conditional Voting : A Cross-National Analysis

Corruption and Electoral Accountability: Avenues for Future Research

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