The Economics of Privacy

Acquisti, Alessandro; Taylor, Curtis R.; Wagman, Liad

doi:10.1257/jel.54.2.442

Cited by 871 publications

(466 citation statements)

References 242 publications

(237 reference statements)

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“…This counterfactual leads to a signaling equilibrium, in which scores predicting a high likelihood of recidivism are inferred (albeit with some uncertainty) from a choice not to reveal the score. This is an example of a more general observation that the potential for signaling equilibria undercuts the assumption that allowing individuals to choose to withhold or reveal personal information systematically protects them (see [22]). Third, we explore the counterfactual difference between basing a sentencing decision on an algorithmic prediction and basing a sentencing decision on human judgment.…”

Section: Figure 2 Well-being Over a Non-recidivist Minority Defendanmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Harm-Reduction Framework for Algorithmic Fairness

Altman

Wood

Vayena

2018

IEEE Secur. Privacy

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Section: Figure 2 Well-being Over a Non-recidivist Minority Defendanmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Harm-Reduction Framework for Algorithmic Fairness

Altman

Wood

Vayena

2018

IEEE Secur. Privacy

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“…The most notable example of this mutual influence is the development of the EU legal framework for data protection as it has developed over time. Further, perhaps less obvious examples include transnational discussions on topics such as the "economics of privacy" (Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman 2016), a theme that has made its way into the German debate in recent years. Third, the form of the German consent debate is distinct in that it has evolved as a hybrid of a scholarly, a societal, and a technical debate, involving academics, members of data protection authorities, and lawyers and data protection officers working in the private sector.…”

Section: Case Selection: the German Consent Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

The Consent Paradox: Accounting for the Prominent Role of Consent in Data Protection

Bergemann

2018

IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract. The concept of consent is a central pillar of data protection. It features prominently in research, regulation, and public debates on the subject, in spite of the wide-ranging criticisms that have been levelled against it. In this paper, I refer to this as the consent paradox. I argue that consent continues to play a central role not despite but because the criticisms of it. I analyze the debate on consent in the scholarly literature in general, and among German data protection professionals in particular, showing that it is a focus on the informed individual that keeps the concept of consent in place. Critiques of consent based on the notion of "informedness" reinforce the centrality of consent rather than calling it into question. They allude to a market view that foregrounds individual choice. Yet, the idea of a data market obscures more fundamental objections to consent, namely the individual's dependency on data controllers' services that renders the assumption of free choice a fiction. Terms of use: Documents in

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“…As a result, a growing body of literature in economics and related fields has focused on privacy issues (see Acquisti et al, 2016 for a summary).…”

Section: The Market For Online Advertising and Consumer Trackingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Follow the Money: Online Piracy and Self-Regulation in the Advertising Industry

2018

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. In this paper, we study the effects of a self-regulatory effort, orchestrated by the European Commission, that aims to reduce advertising revenues for publishers of copyright infringing content. Historical data lets us follow how the third-party advertising and tracking services associated with a large number of piracy websites and a corresponding set of legitimate "placebo" websites change after the agreement to self-regulate went in place. We find that larger EU-based advertisers comply with the initiative and reduce their connections with piracy websites. We do not find reductions for other non-advertising services that track consumers, which has potentially important implications for the efficiency of targeted advertising. JEL-Codes: K400, L500, L800. Terms of use: Documents in

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The Economics of Privacy

Cited by 871 publications

References 242 publications

A Harm-Reduction Framework for Algorithmic Fairness

A Harm-Reduction Framework for Algorithmic Fairness

The Consent Paradox: Accounting for the Prominent Role of Consent in Data Protection

Follow the Money: Online Piracy and Self-Regulation in the Advertising Industry

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