The Economics of Planning Gain: a re-appraisal

Bowers, John

doi:10.1080/00420989220081311

Cited by 27 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…to pay the public infrastructure and social housing needed to support the new developed (or re-developed) areas. The value of these impacts represents the social costs or compensation that can be exacted by the community that bears such costs (Bowers, 1992;Webster, 1998). A first sort of indirect instruments are contributions to be paid by property owners who benefit from a public investment in infrastructure, regardless of whether or not they are developing their land and regardless of land-use regulation decisions, for example, 'baatbelasting' in the Netherlands, 'Erschlieβsungsbeitrag' in Germany and 'opłaty adiaceńskie' in Poland (when used to charge landowners that benefit from public infrastructure works -Havel, 2016;Ossowicz, 2017, p. 6).…”

Section: Public Value Capture In Urban Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of negotiated developer obligations in financing large public infrastructure after the economic crisis in the Netherlands

Gielen

Lenferink

2018

European Planning Studies

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The economic crisis that started in 2009 has negatively impacted in the Netherlands the available financial resources for urban development. Dutch municipalities struggle since then with falling local financial sources, especially since active public land policy, traditionally an important additional financial source, became not so profitable anymore. One supposed effect is the limited degree to which municipalities can nowadays finance public infrastructure that serves wider areas, thus more than one specific development site (i.e. 'large' public infrastructure). Until now, however, there are no data available that support this claim. In this paper, we explore this and the role that developer obligations can play as an alternative, compensating financial source. Developer obligations are in many countries a growing popular public value capturing instrument, but in the Netherlands, a relative new phenomenon. On the basis of surveys, interviews and policy analysis, we conclude that at least a quarter of Dutch municipalities use developer obligations to obtain financial sources for large infrastructure. This seems, however, so far not to compensate for the diminishing of other municipal financial sources. The paper ends with some speculation about the future evolvement of developer obligations in the Netherlands. ARTICLE HISTORY

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Section: Public Value Capture In Urban Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of negotiated developer obligations in financing large public infrastructure after the economic crisis in the Netherlands

Gielen

Lenferink

2018

European Planning Studies

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“…There is a long established yet largely theoretical literature on the welfare effects of land value capture to compensate for negative externalities generated by development, to provide public goods and/or to gain some of the unearned increment in socially generated land value uplifts. This literature has evaluated the effects of developer contributions on allocative efficiency with a focus on the impact of land value capture (through developer contributions) on the quantity and form of development and consumer welfare (see Evans, 1992;Keogh, 1985;Bowers, 1992 andWhitehead, 2002).…”

Section: Methodology and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy shifts, developer contributions and land value capture in London 2005–2017

2018

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“…Because of rents generated from changing land use and land-use density, alterations to land-use plans encourage rent-seeking. Bargaining for an increase in landuse density is a typical pursuit in seeking rent: the capture of unearned profits incurs a cost in the form of congestion externalities borne by neighbours and society in general (Bowers, 1992). The following two cases illustrate what occurs in the absence of the state as a third-party in constructing the emerging urban development market by providing proper order.…”

Section: The Role Of China's Local Developmental State In Urban Constmentioning

confidence: 99%

Local developmental state and order in China's urban development during transition

Zhu

2004

Int J Urban Regional Res

156

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Rules and order in urban construction, and thus the relationship between the market and the state, are a fundamental issue for urban development. In China, a transition economy, marketization has been actively promoted under the economic reforms to replace central‐planning and has contributed significantly to the subsequent dynamic urban growth. However, the role of the state in defining an institutional framework for the market is lagging behind. Fiscal deficiency in conjunction with a pro‐growth position undermines the capacity of the local developmental state to exercise effective developmental controls. Without effective state enforcement of rules, market order does not emerge when uncertainty pervades the marketplace. The phenomenon of urban villages and the case of Luohu's redevelopment clearly show that the absence of the state both in constructing the market and as a third‐party gives rise to the logic of the commons or quasi‐commons in the land development market. Inferior and suboptimal developments ensue. En construction urbaine, les règles et la discipline, donc le rapport entre marché et État, constituent un aspect fondamental de l'aménagement des villes. Dans l'économie de transition chinoise, la commercialisation – activement stimulée par des réformes économiques visant à remplacer la planification centrale – a énormément contribuéà la dynamique de la croissance urbaine. Toutefois, le rôle de l'État dans la définition du cadre institutionnel du marché ne suit pas le rythme. Carences fiscales associées à une position favorable à la croissance empêchent l'État local moteur de développement de contrôler efficacement la croissance. Sans une application étatique effective des règles, il ne naït pas de discipline de marché, l'incertitude régnant. Le phénomène des villages urbains et le cas du réaménagement de Luohu montrent clairement que l'absence de l'État, tant dans l'élaboration du marché qu'en tant que tiers, introduit la logique des terrains communaux ou quasi‐communaux sur le marché de l'aménagement foncier. Il en résulte des équipements de second ordre, inférieurs à la qualité optimale.

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The Economics of Planning Gain: a re-appraisal

Abstract: This paper is a critical examination of certain aspects of the literature on the economics of planning gain. The principal question it addresses is whether the introduction of planning gain into the planning process is likely to enhance consumer welfare.

Cited by 27 publications

References 2 publications

The role of negotiated developer obligations in financing large public infrastructure after the economic crisis in the Netherlands

The role of negotiated developer obligations in financing large public infrastructure after the economic crisis in the Netherlands

Policy shifts, developer contributions and land value capture in London 2005–2017

Local developmental state and order in China's urban development during transition

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