The Economics of Ownership, Access and Trade in Digital Data

Duch‐Brown, Néstor; Martens, Bertin; Mueller‐Langer, Frank

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2914144

Cited by 58 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 103 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…There are possible ways to deal with this problem, without that requiring any intervention from a competition law perspective, such as providing assets/property rights to everyone in society so that they can employ these as a collateral in financial markets, or eventually a more equal distribution of the property of productive assets 330 . In the modern digital and data-hungry economy that could also involve the possibility, for instance, of personal data to be considered as labour that should give rise to some residual claim over the value, on at least part of the value, generated by this data in financial and/or product markets 331 , for instance, the development of property-like rights for the individuals or companies generating this data at the first place 332 .…”

Section: B Competition Law For Reducing Inequality: a Populist Appromentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition Law as a Form of Social Regulation

Lianos

2020

The Antitrust Bulletin

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

For a long time considered a fringe topic, of interest for developing and emergent economies, the question of inequality and poverty has recently taken center stage in mainstream competition law scholarship in the developed countries. Some of this literature deplores the current state of competition law, which has largely ignored this issue, and argues for a different paradigm that would actively engage with economic inequality and its causes. Taking a social contract perspective, and noting the hybrid nature of competition law, which is a tool of economic order, but also a form of social regulation, this study explores the main difficulty in enriching competition law with equity concerns: the economic foundations of mainstream competition law in welfare economics and the crucial separation of the economic efficiency dimension from that of distributive justice. It then examines alternative traditions in economic thought, which are more compatible with an egalitarian perspective. It then turns to the institutional question, exploring the various instruments that governments dispose in order to equalize, and the respective role of more conventional tools against inequality, such as taxation, concluding that the institutional argument against equity concerns in competition law does not stand serious scrutiny. It also critically engages with the argument that there is a trade-off between equality and efficiency, and again concludes that this argument does not stand serious scrutiny. The final part revisits the thorny question of what is to be equalized. Drawing on the idea of “complex equality,” it presents the contours of a fairness-driven competition law.

show abstract

Section: B Competition Law For Reducing Inequality: a Populist Appromentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition Law as a Form of Social Regulation

Lianos

2020

The Antitrust Bulletin

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)-arguably the most comprehensive data privacy regulation in the world-deliberately excludes full and transferable private ownership rights for personal data. This decision was taken on the basis that privacy is a basic human right that cannot be alienated (Duch-Brown et al, 2017).…”

Section: Ii3 a Tradable Limitedly Fungible Experience Goodmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Properties of Data and the Monopolistic Tendencies of Data Economy: Policies to Limit an Orwellian Possibility

Cheng

2020

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Working Papers

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The potential of data for supporting development is bounded only by the amount and variety of data that can be collected and analyzed, which is to say it is almost infinite. However, if data's vast benefits are disproportionately captured by few in the society, leaving no one behind-an overarching principle of the Sustainable Development Goals-would be difficult to attain, even when everyone benefits from the use of data. This paper discusses key data properties and dynamics in data economy that create the tendencies for monopolies to emerge, reinforcing unbalanced power between corporates and other actors and generating negative distributional implications. If mismanaged, transformation toward the data economy could end up being an unequalizing force in an already highly-unequal world. In the context of data economy, this paper presents critiques of the common approaches to deal with monopolies. Self-correction in market is unlikely to happen fast enough but breaking up or nationalizing data monopolies are undesirable from effectiveness and innovation perspectives. Strengthening data ownership is key to rebalancing the power asymmetry between corporates and digital subjects, but difficulty of data valuation needs to be overcome. Analyses in this paper support further exploring the idea of setting up an independent, accountable and forward-looking Digital Authority that has both competition and noncompetition goals.

show abstract

“…Additionally, information on user behaviour serves as the basis for a precise advertisement launch [40]. Moreover, personal data resources are now critical guarantees for the high synergy of a multi-sided market [41]. Any type of data resource can be used and consumed by multiple stakeholders in different markets in real time [42].…”

Section: Related Research On Personal Data Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural Holes in the Multi-Sided Market: A Market Allocation Structure Analysis of China’s Car-Hailing Platform in the Context of Open Innovation

et al. 2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Car-hailing platform governance is an emerging topic of research and practice. The governance of the data-driven platform economy is challenging the research paradigm of competition regulation in the context of open innovation. This research is trying to reveal the market allocation structure of China’s online car-hailing industry from the perspective of personal data allocation by the study of Application Programming Interface (API) of sample platforms. On the basis of the networked nature of personal data allocation via APIs, this research constructs a mathematical model of the edge weight of data resource connections between platforms. Furthermore, this research optimises the structural hole analysis of complex networks to discuss the state of personal data resource allocation in China’s car-hailing industry. Results reveal that there are obvious structural holes within the sample network. When compared with related indicators, we found that accessing personal data resources is an essential component of the sample network competition capability and sustainable innovation. Social media platforms and online payment platforms more greatly impact car-hailing platform competition than other types of platforms within the multi-sided market context. This research offers a research perspective of personal data allocation for further study of competition, regulation and sustainable innovation of data-driven platform economies.

show abstract

The Economics of Ownership, Access and Trade in Digital Data

Cited by 58 publications

References 103 publications

Competition Law as a Form of Social Regulation

Competition Law as a Form of Social Regulation

Economic Properties of Data and the Monopolistic Tendencies of Data Economy: Policies to Limit an Orwellian Possibility

Structural Holes in the Multi-Sided Market: A Market Allocation Structure Analysis of China’s Car-Hailing Platform in the Context of Open Innovation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About