The Economic Logic of Asian Preferential Trade Agreements: The Role of Intra-Industry Trade

Manger, Mark S.

doi:10.1017/s1598240800008894

Cited by 14 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 62 publications

(59 reference statements)

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“…Several factors contributed to this shift, including the simple fact that the original subjects of the developmental state literature—Japan, Korea, and Taiwan—entered a new phase in their growth in which other political economy topics—from financial crises to inequality and social policy to social media—have received more attention. At the regional level, a focus on international institutions and trade agreements has, with some exceptions (for example, Manger 2014; Ravenhill 2017) been almost entirely divorced from a focus on the interplay between state and business.…”

Section: Theoretical Touch Pointsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Roundtable on Rick Doner, Gregory Noble, and John Ravenhill, The Political Economy of Automotive Industrialization in East Asia

Haggard¹,

Pepinsky²

2022

J. East Asian Stud.

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Section: Theoretical Touch Pointsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Roundtable on Rick Doner, Gregory Noble, and John Ravenhill, The Political Economy of Automotive Industrialization in East Asia

Haggard¹,

Pepinsky²

2022

J. East Asian Stud.

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“…Also, as Marvel & Ray (1987) mentioned, it is difficult for the importcompeting sectors to seek the protection under intra-industry trade, because they have to take into account the interests of not only consumers which are related to import but also producers which are related to export. Recently, Manger (2014) argued that intra-industry trade is less likely to be excluded from tariff reduction in Japan and South Korea's preferential trade agreements (PTAs), because PTAs help the firms specialize their production. However, Gilligan (1997) argued that intra-industry trade would reduce the collective action problems, thus increasing the demand for protection.…”

Section: Econometric Specificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade creation, political sensitivity and product exclusions: the political economy of agriculture protection in China’s FTAs*

Lyu¹,

Prehn²,

Zhang³

et al. 2021

Aus J Agri & Res Econ

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One of the most significant features in Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is that certain products are excluded from tariff concession. Why do some products get more protection in FTAs?In this paper, using the highly disaggregated product-level data in agricultural sector of China's FTAs, we examined and extended the hypothesis developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), illustrating the products which are more likely to be excluded in FTAs. Our results suggest that, with the involvement of political costs to incumbent government, products which experience trade creation and have more political sensitivity are more likely to be excluded in FTAs. Moreover, we revealed that the Chinese government tend to achieve different goals through negotiation power, seeking more economic benefits from big-trading partners while giving more concession to small-trading partners.

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“…Finally, some show regular ups and downs, for example, Italy and France, whereas the Scandinavian countries switched from small deficits to a significant persistent surplus in the early 1990s. Notably, these imbalances remain even when we consider that much trade today is in parts, components, and machinery (Johnson, 2014;Johnson & Noguera, 2012;Manger, 2014): Although "where value is added" matters marginally for bilateral trade imbalances, overall imbalances are by definition unchanged because they are equivalent in gross and valued-added terms. 3 Although the existence of imbalances per se is not surprising, we would expect current accounts to adjust eventually via the exchange rate or relative prices.…”

Section: Current Accounts Since Bretton Woodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Origins of Persistent Current Account Imbalances in the Post-Bretton Woods Era

Manger

Sattler

2019

Comparative Political Studies

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Why do some countries run persistent current account surpluses? Why do others run deficits, often over decades, leading to enduring global imbalances? Such persistent imbalances are the root cause of many financial crises and a major source of international economic conflict. We propose that differences in wage-bargaining institutions explain a large share of imbalances through their effect on the trade balance. In countries with coordinated wage bargaining, wage growth in export industries can be restrained to ensure competitiveness, leading to persistent trade surpluses. We estimate the contribution of these institutions to trade balances in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries since 1977 and find ample support for our hypothesis. Contrary to much of the literature, the choice of fixed or floating exchange rate regimes has only a small effect on trade or current account balances. In other words, internal adjustment in surplus countries via wage-bargaining institutions trumps external adjustment by deficit countries.

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The Economic Logic of Asian Preferential Trade Agreements: The Role of Intra-Industry Trade

Cited by 14 publications

References 62 publications

Roundtable on Rick Doner, Gregory Noble, and John Ravenhill, The Political Economy of Automotive Industrialization in East Asia

Roundtable on Rick Doner, Gregory Noble, and John Ravenhill, The Political Economy of Automotive Industrialization in East Asia

Trade creation, political sensitivity and product exclusions: the political economy of agriculture protection in China’s FTAs*

The Origins of Persistent Current Account Imbalances in the Post-Bretton Woods Era

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