The economic case for prioritizing governance over financial incentives in REDD+

Abstract

4This article contributes to the ongoing debate on the role of public policies and financial 5 incentives in Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+). It 6 argues that the subordination of policies to results-based payments for emission 7 reductions causes severe economic inefficiencies affecting the opportunity cost, 8 transaction cost and economic rent of the programme. Such problems can be addressed 9 by establishing sound procedural, land and financial governance at the national level, 10 before REDD+ economic incentives are delivered at scale. Consideration is given to each 11 governance dimension, the entry points for policy intervention and the impact on costs. 12International support must consider the financial and political cost of governance 13 reforms, and use a pay-for-results ethos based on output and outcome indicators. This 14 can be done in the readiness process but only if the latter's legal force, scope, 15 magnitude and time horizon are adequately reconsidered. In sum, the paper provides 16 ammunition for the institutionalist argument that UNFCCC Parties must prioritise 17 governance reform between now and the entry into force of the new climate agreement 18 in 2020, and specific recommendations about how this can be done: only by doing so will 19 they create the basis for the programme's financial sustainability.

Prospects and challenges of tenure and forest governance reform in the context of REDD+ initiatives in Nepal

“…The governance architecture, legal and institutional reforms and distribution of resources and powers to forest dependent communities including funding arrangements strongly influence policy outcomes (Vatn and Vedeld, 2013). While REDD+ policies have been designed to provide incentives for forest conservation, critiques argue that a narrowly conceived incentive mechanism alone will have little impacts on reducing emission as a broad range of political and economic factors shapes the complex processes of deforestation and forest degradation (Fosci, 2012). A plethora of literature indeed suggests that weak tenure and poor governance decisively contribute to deforestation and degradation (D&D) and therefore pose critical challenges to REDD + (Larson, 2011;Persha and Hayes, 2010;Sandbrook et al, 2010).…”

Are Protected Forests of Bangladesh Prepared for the Implementation of REDD+? A Forest Governance Analysis from Rema-Kalenga Wildlife Sanctuary

“…REDD+ has become a reference framework for national forest governance but weak forest governance structures are one of the main challenges for its implementation, while carbon effectiveness, efficiency and equity (3Es) are other challenges [17,28]. Previous studies have indicated that to be effective, a REDD+ programme should consider the following issues: build on strong forest governance structure and institutional linkages [29], use bottom-up approaches [30], and promote the full participation of relevant stakeholders particularly local and indigenous communities including women in all phases [31].…”

Following REDD+: Elite agendas, political temporalities, and the politics of environmental policy failure in Guyana

“…Angelsen et al 2018). However, while these policy-oriented debates have tended to see problems of slow or failed implementation as related to technical questions of finance or institutional design (Palmer 2011;Streck 2012;Fosci 2013;Angelsen 2018), this present article examines the extent to which policy failure or ineffectiveness has been shaped by the politics of the policy process itself (e.g. Keeley & Scoones 1999.…”