The economic and political determinants of IMF and world bank lending in the Middle East and North Africa

The effects of IMF programs on U.S. foreign direct investment in the developing world

“…4 Although, as noted by Boockmann and Dreher (2003) and Dreher and Rupprecht (2007), the mandate that IMF borrowers institute market reforms as part of the loan conditionality program does not mean that the IMF is successful in getting borrowers to initiate reforms (and the net effect of IMF programs on the implementation of marketoriented reforms may even be negative), the catalytic role of the Fund is to promote reforms that serve as a positive signal for investors. Because loan disbursements are conditioned on economic policy changes that the IMF Executive Board monitors for compliance (Stone 2002(Stone , 2004Harrigan et al 2006), the IMF helps to reinforce the perception of policy commitments to market reforms favored by investors (Gould 2003, 558-559). In fact, Stanley Fischer (1999), the former First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, contends that economic policies recommended by the IMF serve as investment catalysts.…”

Donor influence in multilateral development banks: The case of the Asian Development Bank

“…The United States appears to play the dominant role in the World Bank (Andersen, Hansen, & Markussen, 2006;Fleck & Kilby, 2006;Harrigan, Wang, & El-Said, 2006) and the Inter-American Development Bank (Strand, 2003a). In contrast, the African Development Bank has limited explicitly the participation of non-regional countries, effectively preventing any member from dominating the institution, either in terms of formal voting power or operations (Strand, 2001;Mingst, 1990).…”

The IMF and the World Bank in Jordan: A case of over optimism and elusive growth

“…Donor interest, both commercial interests and geo-political interests, have been convincingly shown to influence the allocation of aid in many other studies (for an excellent survey of this literature see McGillivray & White, 1993). Our work and that of others (Harrigan et al, 2006) has shown that both the IMF and World Bank are strongly influenced by their major shareholders, especially the USA, in terms of the allocation of policy-based loans.…”

“…Some of our work presented elsewhere (Harrigan, El-Said, & Wang, 2006) argues that the World Bank and the IMF are not immune from donor interest when it comes to their dealing with MENA countries. Donor interest, both commercial interests and geo-political interests, have been convincingly shown to influence the allocation of aid in many other studies (for an excellent survey of this literature see McGillivray & White, 1993).…”