The Early Modern SubjectSelf-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume

Thiel, Udo

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542499.001.0001

Cited by 162 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…Notions of identity and the Self and their relation to each other are said to emerge from ancient Greco-Romans' uses of theatre masks [6] and from their ideas of a persona [7] in their legal terminology (Marshall and Barbour, 2015;Burkitt, 2011;Thiel, 2011;Martin and Barresi, 2006;Arendt, 1963;. Moreover, in Arendt's (1963Arendt's ( , 1958 discussions of politics and the human condition identities are described as "... implicit in everything somebody says and does" [8].…”

Section: Theme 1: Making Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Crowdsourcing identities: On identity as an existential practice mediated by contemporary digital technology

Hällgren

2019

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The purpose of this article is to outline crowdsourcing identities as one way to think about humans’ making of identity when practiced in conditions mediated by contemporary digital technologies. It brings together human practices, theory and technology and draws on perspectives of existentialism, social onstructivism, technology and ideas about crowdsourcing. Humans’ making of identity is considered a practice that concerns continuous requests and answers about existential matters of being, becoming and belonging: Who am I? How do I appear to others? Who can I be and become? Where do I belong? In that sense, it is a relational and social practice that is essential to exist as someone — rather than as no one. However, contemporary digital technologies such as social media are not considered essential to this practice. Technologies are thought of as mediating conditions where, for instance, social interactions about existential matters, such as the making of identity, can be practiced in ways that extend on what were possible in predigital times. In multimodal, multidirectional, collaborative and networked ways humans can represent, communicate, gather information and also engage online crowds of others in continuous requests and answers about being, becoming and belonging; Who am I? How do I appear to others? Who can I be and become? And, where do I belong? To illustrate this, two brief narratives of Mary and Steve introduce the article. The making of identity, the duality of Self and Other, the gaze as a panopticon of others, identity and technology and ideas about crowdsourcing are presented and outlined, converging into the interpretive lens of crowdsourcing identities — one way to think about the making of identity when practiced in conditions mediated by contemporary digital technology.

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Section: Theme 1: Making Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Crowdsourcing identities: On identity as an existential practice mediated by contemporary digital technology

Hällgren

2019

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“…35 An important implication of Locke’s account is that the existence of an immaterial soul is irrelevant with respect to personhood, personal identity over time, and even personal immortality. According to Udo Thiel, one reason that Locke’s consciousness-based account of personal identity was so influential in the eighteenth century was precisely because ‘it remains neutral with respect to the debate between materialist and immaterialist philosophers of mind’ effectively making one’s ‘view about the nature of the thinking substance … irrelevant’ (Thiel 2011, 144). Despite the neutrality of his account, there is, I believe, good reason to think that Locke actually doubts the existence of immaterial souls, at least in the case of humans.…”

Section: Locke Crypto-materialistmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is worth noting that Strawson’s account is influenced by ( mortalist ) Edmund Law’s 1769 Defence of Mr Locke’s Opinion Concerning Personal Identity , a transcription of which Strawson appends to his book. Thiel (2011) provides a critical survey of self-consciousness and personal identity in early modern thought in his The Early Modern Subject . See also the next note.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

John Locke, ‘Hobbist’: of sleeping souls and thinking matter

Dempsey

2017

Can. J. of Philosophy

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In this paper, I consider Isaac Newton’s fevered accusation that John Locke is a ‘Hobbist.’ I suggest a number of ways in which Locke’s account of the mind–body relation could plausibly be construed as Hobbesian. Whereas Newton conceives of the human mind as an immaterial substance and venerates it as a finite image of the Divine Mind, I argue that Locke utterly deflates the religious, ethical, and metaphysical significance of an immaterial soul. Even stronger, I contend that there is good reason to suspect that Locke is a crypto-materialist, at least with respect to human beings, and in this respect, could reasonably be labeled a ‘Hobbist.’

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“…Some Australasian work in the history of more distant theories of mind has explicitly or critically addressed themes in philosophy of mind and cognition (for example Freeland 1989;Kassler 1995;Gaukroger 1997Gaukroger , 1998Sutton 1998aSutton , 2000aMacdonald 2003, Brown 2006Pettit 2009;Thiel 2011). In other work, theoretical approaches to film, literature, art, or technology have been firmly based in specific frameworks from the philosophy of cognition (Currie 1995(Currie , 2010Dutton 2008;Bullot 2009;Boyd 2010;Malpas 2000;Tribble 2011;Tribble and Keene 2011).…”

Section: Other Psychological Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%