The dynamics of the feud over Iraq

Pond, Elizabeth

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491191.004

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 75 publications

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“…However, at heart, some Member States did not share the UK and other’s perception of Iraq as being a key threat which required immediate action to overthrow its regime, as the evidence that linked the regime in Iraq with an existing WMD programme did not completely convince them (Finnemore, 2005: 202; Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 83). This perception has already been well documented in several studies on France and Germany during the Iraq crisis (Coicaud, 2006; Davidson, 2011: 150; Forsberg, 2005: 223; Müller, 2003: 6–7; Pond, 2005: 36). Joschka Fischer, then the German Foreign Minister, spoke, for example, only about suspicions concerning the Iraqi WMD programme: ‘Quite a few states suspect that Saddam Hussein’s regime is withholding relevant information and concealing military capabilities.…”

Section: Convergence and Divergence In The Eu Iraq And Iran Policiessupporting

confidence: 53%

“…At the same time, the opponents of the use of force believed that containment, sanctions and inspections had been working in Iraq. Therefore, they advocated their continued use, especially regarding the alleged Iraqi WMD programme: ‘Precisely because of the effectiveness of the work of the inspectors, we must continue to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis’ (Fischer, 2003; see also Pond, 2005: 34). Germany also saw the use of force as an inappropriate means in the Iraq case (Forsberg, 2005; Müller, 2003: 18).…”

Section: Convergence and Divergence In The Eu Iraq And Iran Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The role of ideas in EU responses to international crises: Comparing the cases of Iraq and Iran

Kienzle¹

2013

Cooperation and Conflict

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This article examines how cognitive and normative ideas influence the ability of the European Union (EU) to formulate common policies in response to international crises such as the 2002/2003 Iraq crisis and the Iranian nuclear crisis (since 2002). It argues that in crisis situations, i.e. in highly uncertain circumstances, ideas become often the principal guide for policy-makers. More specifically, ideas foster interpretations of a crisis along several core themes, above all, how the crisis issue is perceived, which means are deemed to be legitimate and/or effective and, depending on the particular crisis, how other relevant themes are seen, e.g. the appropriate relation with the United States. Thus, the formulation of common EU crisis responses depends on the convergence of these interpretations in member states -as in the Iran crisis. On the contrary, if member states' interpretations diverge beyond a common "ideational space" -as in the case of Iraq -dissonance will be the probable outcome. 2 KeywordsIdeas and foreign policy; cognitive and normative ideas; European foreign and security policy; international crises; Iran; Iraq

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Section: Convergence and Divergence In The Eu Iraq And Iran Policiessupporting

confidence: 53%

Section: Convergence and Divergence In The Eu Iraq And Iran Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of ideas in EU responses to international crises: Comparing the cases of Iraq and Iran

Kienzle¹

2013

Cooperation and Conflict

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“…As early as the February 2002 Munich Security conference, Undersecretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz alarmed western European Atlanticists by conveying the administration's view that, in future engagements, the mission would determine the coalition. The extraordinary invocation of article 5 of the NATO Treaty in the form of an offer by Europe to help an endangered America was effectively rebuffed by a US administration which (at least initially) seemed to care little for international legitimacy (Pond 2005).…”

Section: The Atlantic Alliancementioning

confidence: 99%

The US–UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st-Century Temperature

Dumbrell¹

2009

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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Although highly contested, the concept of the US–UK ‘special relationship’ does have real existence, primarily in the fields of defence and intelligence co‐operation. The end of the premiership of Tony Blair saw the emergence of a significant public debate in the United Kingdom about the future appropriate trajectory for the relationship. This article assesses the state of the special relationship under Prime Minister Gordon Brown, placing it in the context of the wider Atlantic alliance and of perennial concerns about shared values and structural imbalances between London and Washington.

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“…For Blair, however, America’s European allies should act precisely to avoid the United States going it alone. Standing aside in impotent condemnation would, for Blair, “be the biggest impulse to unilateralism there could ever be” (Pond 2005, 48). This was a view he expressed in private and to the cabinet (Cook 2003, 116; Seldon 2004, 573).…”

Section: Tony Blair and The War On Terrormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many European observers were horrified at the Munich Security Conference in February 2002 when Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz repeated Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s earlier comment that for the United States the mission would determine the coalition, and not vice versa . He also left the clear impression that NATO itself was expendable, despite the alliance’s unprecedented invoking of Article 5 of its founding treaty in interpreting the 9/11 attacks on the United States as an attack on all NATO members (Pond 2005, 34). By 2002, then, it is plain that the United States stood alone in its Middle East policies, its sponsorship of the War on Terror, its sheer military power, and its dissimilarity to other international players.…”

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confidence: 99%

Working with Allies: The United States, the United Kingdom, and the War on Terror

Dumbrell

2006

Politics & Policy

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This article considers the special case of the United States’ relationship with Great Britain—America’s closest ally—in the context of the post‐9/11 debate over unilateralism and multilateralism. It explains the development of unilateral preferences in the post‐Cold War order and, latterly, in the foreign policies of the George W. Bush Administration. The Bush Administration’s outlook is seen as much more complex than many commentators assume, notwithstanding its acceptance of the logic of unilateralism and “coalitions of the willing” in pursuing the “War on Terror.” The putative “specialness” of the U.S.–U.K. relationship is examined through a skeptical eye, from both the U.S. and British perspectives. Its contemporary manifestation is placed to a considerable degree by the personal leadership style and convictions of Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain. In the final part of the article, the U.S.–U.K. alliance is assessed in light of the broader debate about America’s need for allies in the new international order and its capacity to “work with allies” effectively.

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The dynamics of the feud over Iraq

Cited by 5 publications

References 75 publications

The role of ideas in EU responses to international crises: Comparing the cases of Iraq and Iran

The role of ideas in EU responses to international crises: Comparing the cases of Iraq and Iran

The US–UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st-Century Temperature

Working with Allies: The United States, the United Kingdom, and the War on Terror

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