The dynamics of moral progress

Abstract

Assuming that there is moral progress, and assuming that the abolition of slavery is an example of it, how does moral progress occur? Is it mainly driven by specific individuals who have gained new moral insights, or by changes in the socio‐economic and epistemic conditions in which agents morally judge the norms and practices of their society, and act upon these judgements? In this paper, I argue that moral progress is a complex process in which changes at the level of belief and changes at the level of institutions and social practices are deeply intertwined, and that changes in the socio‐economic and epistemic conditions of moral agency constitute the main motor of moral progress. I develop my view of moral progress by way of grappling with Michelle Moody‐Adams’ prominent philosophical account of it. My view is less intellectualistic and individualistic than hers, does not presuppose meta‐ethical moral realism, and blurs her distinction between moral progress in beliefs and moral progress in social practices. I point out the limits of humans to progress morally, which are partly grounded in our evolutionary history, and argue that moral progress is always of a ‘local’ nature.

Murdoch on ethical formation in a changing world

“…This fast and easy route could be combined with an idea of societal moral changes as instances of progress or regress in relation to such transcendent goods. This approach resonates with a contemporary philosophical interest in moral progress (Herman, 2019; Kitcher, 2011; Moody‐Adams, 1999). The current conversations on progress seem to have grown out of a reawakened sensitivity to the relatively rapid changes in certain of our widely shared moral precepts in the past half decade or so, combined with moral philosophers’ disciplinary investment in arguing theoretically for normative conclusions.…”

Another Brick in the Wall? Moral Education, Social Learning, and Moral Progress

“…Second, individual-centric moral change likely facilitates or enables many other types of moral progress, and so even authors who doubt that individuals are the ultimate locus of moral change should still consider changes in their moral beliefs, values, behaviors, etc. (see, Hermann, 2019;Klenk & Sauer, 2021).…”

Theorizing social change

“…Moody‐Adams (1999) and Anderson (2014) argue that philosophy rarely produces by itself the “engaged moral inquirers,” “moral gadflies,” artists, and social movements whose contentious politics confront the powerful with a practical (and not merely speculative) moral problem that reveals their moral error. Buchanan and Powell (2018), Appiah (2011), and others downplay the causal role of moral agency as less decisive than surrounding socioeconomic conditions and wider group dynamics, for example, by arguing that moral revolutions are driven more by parochial codes of honor than advances in moral reasoning (Hermann, 2019; Pleasants, 2011; Tam, 2019). Others argue that social change is best achieved by designing social institutions that seek to alter social norms rather than improving moral reasoning: through adjustments in expectations, incentives, and sanctions (Bicchieri, 2016; Mackie, 1996; Sankaran, 2019).…”