The dynamics of coalition formation – A multilateral bargaining experiment with free timing of moves

Tremewan, James; Vanberg, Christoph

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2016.07.011

Cited by 20 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 29 publications

(18 reference statements)

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“…In stress-testing a seminal model by relaxing a central model assumption our paper shares similarities with the work of Tremewan and Vanberg (2016), who study legislative bargaining in an arguably more realistic but not theoretically (analytically) solvable set-up than that in the established bargaining models. We see this approach, which is much less often followed than simply implementing the original structure of a game theoretic model, as a useful complement.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 77%

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Buying supermajorities in the lab

Fehrler

Schneider

2021

Games and Economic Behavior

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Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world's largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 77%

“…This approach is not very common in the experimental economics literature. A notable exception is the work on legislative bargaining by Tremewan and Vanberg (2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Buying supermajorities in the lab

Fehrler

Schneider

2021

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…For instance, when faced with a two-person coalition with a lower-powered agent, an overwhelming proportion of these agents will propose themselves as the dictator. 26 Apart from pro-social preferences, other pertinent issues that need to be disentangled is the role of errors and reciprocity in the agents' coalition formation strategies.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Tremewan and Vanberg[26] point out that if the outcome from these experiments deviates from theoretical predictions, failure will emanate from behavioral rather than from procedural assumptions.…”

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confidence: 98%

An Experimental Study of Self-Enforcing Coalitions

Jandoc¹,

Juárez

2019

Games

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We study a model in which agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource by forming coalitions with other agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We conduct an economic experiment using this model to investigate possible behavioral factors that may explain deviations from theoretical predictions. The main findings show that agents display rational behavior when forming coalitions, especially when they know that a large proportion of their opponents play myopic strategies from the outset. Over time, however, agents learn to behave more strategically and even more rationally, thus enabling agents to display more of the behavior predicted by the coalition formation model with farsighted agents.

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“…A further reason for using cooperative concepts in a repeated payoff environment is given by Nash et al (2012) who follow the same approach for a repeated multilateral bargaining game: in their game, as in ours, almost any outcome can be supported as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, so cooperative theories are required to make useful predictions. 8 Other recent papers using a similar methodology include Berninghaus et al (2006), Burger and Buskens (2009), Tremewan andVanberg (2016), andVan Dolder andBuskens (2014). 9 The paper proceeds as follows: Sect.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Myopic and farsighted stability in network formation games: an experimental study

Teteryatnikova

Tremewan

2019

Econ Theory

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We test the performance of myopic and farsighted stability concepts in a network formation experiment with a stream of payoffs and relatively unstructured link formation process. A subtle treatment variation demonstrates clearly the power of myopic stability concepts in precisely identifying the set of the most stable networks. However, we also find support for the predictions of farsighted concepts of stability, especially those that assume players' pessimism about the eventual outcome of a deviation. This is the first study to demonstrate that there exist environments where farsighted stability concepts identify empirically stable networks that are not identified by myopic concepts. Thus, myopic stability concepts are not necessarily sufficient to predict all stable outcomes in empirical applications.Network interactions involving a regular flow of payoffs feature in many social and economic environments. For example, the export profits of a firm, a bank's risk exposure and associated returns, and the number of papers published by academic researchers depend, respectively, on the network of trade partners (Chaney 2014), the credit and debit relationships among banks (Iori et al. 2008;Martinez-Jaramillo et al. 2014), and the constellation of co-authors (Liu et al. 2011;Ozel 2012) in place at a given point in time. The importance attached to social and professional networks is shown by the popularity of websites such as LinkedIn, Xing, and ResearchGate. The prevalence of situations in which people and firms are concerned with benefits and losses that they derive from their ongoing relationships makes it desirable to understand which network structures in these environments are stable and thus likely to be observed.Many theories have been proposed to predict the stable outcomes of network formation games. As the relationships we are interested in are those where "it takes two to tango", we restrict attention to theories that assume bilateral, or pairwise link formation, where links require the consent of both parties to form, and can be broken unilaterally. Within this approach, we focus on the large and prominent group of cooperative stability concepts, which analyse network stability by describing the conditions that stable networks should satisfy and do not rely on a particular network formation protocol. As we describe in more detail later, these stability concepts can be broadly divided into three classes, assuming myopic, farsighted, or cautious farsighted behaviour. The purpose of this study is to identify which of these classes of concepts best describes the outcomes of network formation in an environment with a flow of payoffs, focusing on the empirical relevance of farsighted and cautious farsighted concepts. 1 We compare the predictive power of pairwise myopic, farsighted, and cautious farsighted stability concepts in a laboratory experiment, implementing two different three-player network formation games. The experiment has three important features. First, it is novel in that it enables the clear ide...

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The dynamics of coalition formation – A multilateral bargaining experiment with free timing of moves

Cited by 20 publications

References 29 publications

Buying supermajorities in the lab

Buying supermajorities in the lab

An Experimental Study of Self-Enforcing Coalitions

Myopic and farsighted stability in network formation games: an experimental study

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