The Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games with Policymaker Cost and Competition Intensity

Abstract

In this paper, a dynamic rent-seeking game incorporating policymaker cost and competition intensity is considered. On the basis of the political environment and rent-seekers with incomplete information set, the locally asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium is proved. The competition intensity and policymaker cost could enlarge the stability region of Nash equilibrium. The higher the competition intensity is, the more the opponent’s expenditure reduces the player’s success probability, which is beneficial to the maintenance of Nash equilibrium. The higher the policymaker cost is, the less easily both players succeed and the more stable the rent-seeking market is. As the competition parameter decreases or the expenditure parameter increases, there will be chaos in a rent-seeking market. Chaos control is in order to stabilize the equilibrium of the rent-seeking game.

The role of business environment optimization on entrepreneurship enhancement

“…First, good business environment implies fair competitive market, and both monopolism and unfair competition decline, market information will be more transparent, and smooth information will lead to greater confidence of entrepreneurs and further enhance entrepreneurial risk-taking (Xie et al, 2021). Second, along with the promotion of legalized business environment, enterprises' production and operation can be based on the law, and government law enforcement must be punished, which can reduce the risk of enterprises' operation and further reduce enterprises' rent-seeking motive (Yu and Xu, 2020). In addition, the better business environment the higher the efficiency of resource allocation in the region, which can save private enterprises' information cost and also reduce private enterprises' rent-seeking motive (Rí o, 2021).…”