The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences

Heifetz, Aviad; Shannon, Chris; Spiegel, Yossi

doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0121-7

Cited by 116 publications

(66 citation statements)

References 58 publications

(39 reference statements)

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“…Our model is also closely related to the "indirect-evolution approach" in economics (30,31). This approach ascribes preference functions to agents and models the evolution of the preferences according to the Nash equilibria they produce in a noncooperative game.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A theory for the evolution of other-regard integrating proximate and ultimate perspectives

Akçay

Cleve

Feldman

et al. 2009

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

119

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Although much previous work describes evolutionary mechanisms that promote or stabilize different social behaviors, we still have little understanding of the factors that drive animal behavior proximately. Here we present a modeling approach to answer this question. Our model rests on motivations to achieve objectives as the proximate determinants of behavior. We develop a two-tiered framework by first modeling the dynamics of a social interaction at the behavioral time scale and then find the evolutionarily stable objectives that result from the outcomes these dynamics produce. We use this framework to ask whether "other-regarding" motivations, which result from a kind of nonselfish objective, can evolve when individuals are engaged in a social interaction that entails a conflict between their material payoffs. We find that, at the evolutionarily stable state, individuals can be other-regarding in that they are motivated to increase their partners' payoff as well as their own. In contrast to previous theories, we find that such motivations can evolve because of their direct effect on fitness and do not require kin selection or a special group structure. We also derive general conditions for the evolutionary stability of other-regarding motivations. Our conditions indicate that other-regarding motivations are more likely to evolve when social interactions and behavioral objectives are both synergistic.A nimal behavior is determined both by proximate mechanisms that dictate an animal's actions in real time and by evolutionary forces that shape these proximate mechanisms. Even though the evolutionary dynamics of social behavior have been extensively studied (1-4), proximate mechanisms of behavior and how they interface with evolutionary forces remain poorly understood (4). In recent years, some models have integrated a proximate mechanism with an evolutionary analysis (5, 6). Furthermore, an explicitly two-tiered approach with potentially cooperative behavioral dynamics embedded in an evolutionary dynamic has been proposed (7) as necessary to understand the evolution of social behavior. We contribute to this literature by developing a unified framework for modeling the evolution of a specific type of behavioral interaction based on a well-defined proximate mechanism.Our proximate mechanism is based on the notion that animals are motivated to achieve certain objectives. Goal-seeking behavior has been a recurring theme in animal behavior and has been an integral part of earlier ethological thinking (e.g. 8, 9). However, this idea lost its prominence after the emergence of modern behavioral ecology, which focuses mainly on the fitness consequences of behavior (see, for example, page 6 of ref. 10). In addition, proximate models of behavior based on goal-seeking have focused mostly on nonsocial behaviors such as foraging (9) and have rarely considered social interactions. Here, we study goal-seeking behavior in the context of a social interaction by developing a model of a pair of interacting animals whose motivations ...

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A theory for the evolution of other-regard integrating proximate and ultimate perspectives

Akçay

Cleve

Feldman

et al. 2009

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

119

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…The most closely related models in biology are models of the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma (CIPD; McNamara et al 1999;Wahl and Nowak 1999;André and Day 2007) that look at the evolution of linear-response rules; given a behavioral mechanism of linear responses, the response slope is analogous to r. In economics, the most related field is that of "indirect evolution" (Güth 1995;Dekel et al 2007;Heifetz et al 2007a;Alger and Weibull 2010), which allows individuals to choose actions based on individual preferences and studies the evolution of those preferences. This work has focused mostly on the informational constraints required for players to act in a way that does not maximize their immediate self-interest.…”

Section: Indirect Genetic Effects and Behavioral Responses In Structumentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavioral Responses in Structured Populations Pave the Way to Group Optimality

Akçay

Cleve

2012

The American Naturalist

185

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An unresolved controversy regarding social behaviors is exemplified when natural selection might lead to behaviors that maximize fitness at the social-group level but are costly at the individual level. Except for the special case of groups of clones, we do not have a general understanding of how and when group-optimal behaviors evolve, especially when the behaviors in question are flexible. To address this question, we develop a general model that integrates behavioral plasticity in social interactions with the action of natural selection in structured populations. We find that group-optimal behaviors can evolve, even without clonal groups, if individuals exhibit appropriate behavioral responses to each other's actions. The evolution of such behavioral responses, in turn, is predicated on the nature of the proximate behavioral mechanisms. We model a particular class of proximate mechanisms, prosocial preferences, and find that such preferences evolve to sustain maximum group benefit under certain levels of relatedness and certain ecological conditions. Thus, our model demonstrates the fundamental interplay between behavioral responses and relatedness in determining the course of social evolution. We also highlight the crucial role of proximate mechanisms such as prosocial preferences in the evolution of behavioral responses and in facilitating evolutionary transitions in individuality. Disciplines Behavior and Ethology | Biology | Population Biology CommentsAt the time of publication, author Erol Akçay was affiliated with the University of Tennessee. Currently, he is a faculty member at the Department of Biology at the University of Pennsylvania. Online enhancement: appendix.abstract: An unresolved controversy regarding social behaviors is exemplified when natural selection might lead to behaviors that maximize fitness at the social-group level but are costly at the individual level. Except for the special case of groups of clones, we do not have a general understanding of how and when group-optimal behaviors evolve, especially when the behaviors in question are flexible. To address this question, we develop a general model that integrates behavioral plasticity in social interactions with the action of natural selection in structured populations. We find that group-optimal behaviors can evolve, even without clonal groups, if individuals exhibit appropriate behavioral responses to each other's actions. The evolution of such behavioral responses, in turn, is predicated on the nature of the proximate behavioral mechanisms. We model a particular class of proximate mechanisms, prosocial preferences, and find that such preferences evolve to sustain maximum group benefit under certain levels of relatedness and certain ecological conditions. Thus, our model demonstrates the fundamental interplay between behavioral responses and relatedness in determining the course of social evolution. We also highlight the crucial role of proximate mechanisms such as prosocial preferences in the evolution of behavioral respons...

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“…The so-called indirect evolutionary approach (see, e.g., Güth andPeleg, 2001, andHeifetz, Shannon, andSpiegel, 2007) concerns the evolutionary stability of preferences under random matching, whereas Bergstrom (1995) analyzes the evolutionary stability of strategies when the players are siblings, so that their "strategy types"are correlated in a speci…c way.…”

Section: Preference Evolution Vs Strategy Evolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution

Alger

Weibull

2010

American Economic Review

129

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We analyze how family ties affect incentives, with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings. The siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty, and they may transfer output to each other. With equally altruistic siblings, their equilibrium effort is nonmonotonic in the common degree of altruism, and it depends on the harshness of the environment. We define a notion of local evolutionary stability of degrees of sibling altruism and show that this degree is lower than the kinship-relatedness factor. Numerical simulations show how family ties vary with the environment, and how this affects economic outcomes. (JEL D13, D64, J12, Z13)

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The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences

Cited by 116 publications

References 58 publications

A theory for the evolution of other-regard integrating proximate and ultimate perspectives

A theory for the evolution of other-regard integrating proximate and ultimate perspectives

Behavioral Responses in Structured Populations Pave the Way to Group Optimality

Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution

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