The Duty to Join Forces: When Individuals Lack Control

Hindriks, Frank

doi:10.1093/monist/onz006

Cited by 21 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…Given a deontic game model in which a group of agents aims to fulfill its collective obligation, it will be convenient to think of a group plan as a non-empty 21 Held argues that a random collection of agents might even have a duty to do so: 'the random collection can be held morally responsible for failing to make a decision on which action to take' (Held 1970, p. 479). See also Collins (2013) and Hindriks (2019). 22 In the theoretical economics literature, the preferred term is team reasoning (Bacharach 1999(Bacharach , 2006Sugden 1993Sugden , 2000Sugden , 2003.…”

Section: Individual Obligations and Member Obligationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The irreducibility of collective obligations

Tamminga

Hindriks

2019

Philos Stud

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Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the individual obligations of the collective's members. Collectivists deny this. We set out to discover who is right by way of a deontic logic of collective action that models collective actions, abilities, obligations, and their interrelations. On the basis of our formal analysis, we argue that when assessing the obligations of an individual agent, we need to distinguish individual obligations from member obligations. If a collective has a collective obligation to bring about a particular state of affairs, then it might be that no individual in the collective has an individual obligation to bring about that state of affairs. What follows from a collective obligation is that each member of the collective has a member obligation to help ensure that the collective fulfills its collective obligation. In conclusion, we argue that our formal analysis supports collectivism.

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Section: Individual Obligations and Member Obligationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The irreducibility of collective obligations

Tamminga

Hindriks

2019

Philos Stud

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“…Yet there are a variety of cases where it is intuitively plausible that even fleeting, unorganized groups do bear collective responsibility. Many such cases involve collective action problems, what Hindriks calls "collective harms" (Hindriks 2019). In this section, we will discuss desiderata for a theory explaining the intuitive appeal of assigning collective responsibility in such cases.…”

Section: Collective Moral Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition to explaining intuitions, a theory of collective responsibility should also cohere with accepted principles of ascribing responsibility. There are four conditions on responsibility which are commonly accepted principles of this sort (Hindriks 2019, p. 206, Schwenkenbecher 2018):…”

Section: Consider the Following Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms

Fleisher

Šešelja

2022

Philos. sci.

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Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief formation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of collective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those preventable only by the action of an unorganized group. We propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility which fills this gap. Building on Hindriks’ (2019) account of collective moral responsibility, we introduce the Epistemic Duty to Join Forces. Our theory provides an account of the responsibilities of scientists to prevent epistemic harms during inquiry.

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“…6 We restrict ourselves to 3 On forward-looking collective moral responsibility, see e.g. Björnsson (2014) and Hindriks (2019). 4 Talk of moral responsibility for a morally neutral action such as raising one's arm (in a context where this has no effect on any other agent) may sound odd and unusual.…”

Section: The Very Idea Of Collective Moral Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective Responsibility and Acting Together

Blomberg

Hindriks

2020

The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility

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What is the moral significance of the contrast between acting together and strategic interaction? We argue that while collective moral responsibility is not uniquely tied to the former, the degree to which the participants in a shared intentional wrongdoing are blameworthy is normally higher than when agents bring about the same wrong as a result of strategic interaction. One argument for this claim focuses on the fact that shared intentions cause intended outcomes in a more robust manner than the intentions involved in strategic interaction. We argue, however, that this in itself is not significant. The significant difference is rather volitional: The parties to a shared intention are mutually implicated in each other's will in a distinct way. Since degree of blameworthiness depends on the quality of will an agent displays in her actions, this explains the higher degree of collective blameworthiness associated with shared intentional wrongdoing.

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The Duty to Join Forces: When Individuals Lack Control

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Cited by 21 publications

References 40 publications

The irreducibility of collective obligations

The irreducibility of collective obligations

Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms

Collective Responsibility and Acting Together

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