The Duty to Forgive Repentant Wrongdoers

Gamlund, Espen

doi:10.1080/09672559.2010.528602

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…The first implication is that on this view it is not the case that forgiveness is always elective, as a number of theorists claim (see, for example, Kolnai [1973–74: 101–102]; Sussman [2005: 87]; Hallich [2013, 2016: 1008–1009]; in thinking that forgiveness is not always elective, I am in agreement with Gamlund [2010] and Milam [2018b]). The diachronic blame reduction in which forgiveness (at least, partly) consists will be rationally required when the agent's diachronic blameworthiness has diminished or extinguished, and the potential forgiver knows this.…”

Section: Implications and Complicationsmentioning

confidence: 76%

“…Blame and forgiveness are categorically distinct in the literal sense that they fall into distinct categories, for forgiveness involves an adjustment with respect to that with which blame is identified. For example, if blame is identified as an attitude, then forgiveness will consist in a particular kind of attitudinal adjustment (similarly, Kekes [2009: 492] characterizes forgiveness as an event; contrast this with those, such as Gamlund [2010], who characterize forgiveness as itself a reactive attitude).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Forgiveness, Repentance, and Diachronic Blameworthiness

Khoury¹

2022

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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Many theorists have found the notion of forgiveness to be paradoxical, for it is thought that only the blameworthy can be appropriately forgiven but that the blameworthy are appropriately blamed, not forgiven. Some have appealed to the notion of repentance to resolve this tension. But others have objected that such a response is explanatorily inadequate in the sense that it merely stipulates and names a solution leaving the transformative power of repentance unexplained. Worse still, others have objected that such a response cannot succeed because no amount of repentance can render the blameworthy not blameworthy. I argue that this latter objection is based on a mistaken assumption, the acknowledgement of which has the power to resolve the paradox in a way that meets the explanatory adequacy challenge and, more generally, has significant implications with which any full theory of forgiveness must engage.

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Section: Implications and Complicationsmentioning

confidence: 76%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Forgiveness, Repentance, and Diachronic Blameworthiness

Khoury¹

2022

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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“…This thought finds many different expressions in the philosophical literature. Some follow Lang in using the language of an obligation (Maring 2020), duty (Gamlund 2010;Radzik 2003: 332-37) or requirement (Milam 2018) to forgive. Others say that it would be wrong (Richards 1988: 80;Smith 1997: 39), immoral (Bovens 2009: 231-32) or unreasonable (Bell 2012;Martin 2010: 547, fn.…”

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confidence: 99%

Obligatory Gifts: An Essay on Forgiveness

Attie-Picker

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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The paper attempts to bridge a gap between two prevalent conceptions of forgiveness that are widely thought to be in opposition. On one side of things, forgiveness is often characterized as a gift. The image is an ever-present one, enduring in popular culture no less than in the sober prose of analytic philosophy. But we also talk of forgiveness as a moral imperative, an important, even vital aspect of our moral life. I argue that, contrary to what may at first appear, the two sides are not in tension, and each gets at something important about the nature of forgiveness. Forgiveness is indeed a gift but, much like actual gifts, it is one we are sometimes required to give.

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“…"Bovens (2009: 232) reiterates that claim. See also:Allais (2013) andGamlund (2010). Many of these sources assert, rather than argue, that there is no right to forgiveness.…”

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confidence: 99%

Is There a Right to Be Forgiven?

Maring

2020

Philosophia

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Imagine a case of wrongdoing-not something trivial, but nothing so serious that adequate reparations are impossible. Imagine, further, that the wrongdoer makes those reparations and sincerely apologizes. Does she have a moral right to be forgiven? The standard view is that she does not, but this paper contends that the standard view is mistaken. It begins by showing that the arguments against a right to be forgiven are inconclusive. It ends by making two arguments in defense of that right.Keywords Forgiveness . Making amends . Right to be forgiven Imagine a case of wrongdoing-not something trivial, but nothing so serious that adequate reparations are impossible. Imagine, further, that the wrongdoer makes those reparations and sincerely apologizes. She becomes what I will call an amends-making offender. 1 Does she have a moral right to be forgiven?The question is not whether there can be weighty moral reasons to forgive, for there surely can be. It might be important to preserve a valuable relationship. Or, perhaps, holding on to resentment will poison your character. The question is not about moral reasons in general, but about moral rights in particular: does the amends-making offender-the wrongdoer who makes adequate reparations and sincerely apologizes-have a right to be forgiven?There is some pressure to answer 'No.' We are typically entitled to demand our rights. Blacks in the civil rights movement did not meekly request equality; they demanded equal treatment as their moral due. But we typically ask for forgivenesswe say "Please forgive me," not "Forgive me now!" On the other hand, there is some Philosophia

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The Duty to Forgive Repentant Wrongdoers

Cited by 7 publications

References 20 publications

Forgiveness, Repentance, and Diachronic Blameworthiness

Forgiveness, Repentance, and Diachronic Blameworthiness

Obligatory Gifts: An Essay on Forgiveness

Is There a Right to Be Forgiven?

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