2010
DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2010.505471
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The Dutch COIN approach: three years in Uruzgan, 2006–2009

Abstract: Rarely has a military commitment led to such intense discussion in the Netherlands as the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) mission in Afghanistan. In February 2010, the Netherlands' coalition government even collapsed after the two largest parties failed to agree on the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Afghanistan later this year. This article deals first of all with the difficult discussion over the Afghanistan mission of the TFU. The authors then subject three ISAF operations to close scrutiny. The authors provide so… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(7 citation statements)
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References 12 publications
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“…On the one hand, key members of the coalition government openly acknowledged that the stabilisation of Afghanistan was in some way linked to the promotion of international order and the fight against international terrorism. National security interests were therefore implicitly (and at times explicitly) proclaimed to be at stake (Dimitriu and de Graaf 2010). On the other hand, the government went to great lengths to frame the mission as first and foremost a stabilisation and reconstruction operation with little risk of getting involved in combat operations.…”
Section: The Netherlandsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the one hand, key members of the coalition government openly acknowledged that the stabilisation of Afghanistan was in some way linked to the promotion of international order and the fight against international terrorism. National security interests were therefore implicitly (and at times explicitly) proclaimed to be at stake (Dimitriu and de Graaf 2010). On the other hand, the government went to great lengths to frame the mission as first and foremost a stabilisation and reconstruction operation with little risk of getting involved in combat operations.…”
Section: The Netherlandsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When it became known in the Netherlands that fighting took place quite frequently, it not only engendered admiration but also fueled existing criticism in parliament and among the public. Decreasing public support for the mission, moreover, became a reason why the mission in Uruzgan was not extended in 2010 (Dimitriu & de Graaf, ; Dimitriu & de Graaf, ; Ringsmose & Børgesen, , pp. 520–521).…”
Section: Moral Injury and Its (Unaddressed) Political Dimensionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On 2 February 2006 the Dutch Second Chamber ratified the decision to deploy soldiers to Uruzgan beginning in August of that year with an end date set for 2008. 33 Given that Canada was to assume a one-year overall leadership term for RC-S in February 2008, extending the commitment to 2009 was a logical decision.…”
Section: : the First Kandahar Extension-2 Yearsmentioning
confidence: 99%