The Dutch Algorithm for Allocation in Living Donor Kidney Exchange

Keizer, Karin M.; Klerk, Marry de; Haase‐Kromwijk, Bernadette; Weimar, Willem

doi:10.1016/j.transproceed.2004.12.096

Cited by 58 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 4 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Although the strict core of the associated pairwise exchange problem may be empty for some preference profile, every age based priority rule selects assignments in the weak core. 17 In the following theorem, we show that age based priority rules satisfy strategy-proofness, and that they are the only priority rules that fulfill this property.…”

Section: General Age Structuresmentioning

confidence: 86%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange

Nicolò

Álvarez

2017

Games and Economic Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We consider a model of Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) with feasibility constraints on the number of patient-donor pairs involved in exchanges. Patients' preferences are restricted so that patients prefer kidneys from compatible younger donors to kidneys from older donors. In this framework, patients with compatible donors may enroll on PKE programs to receive an organ with higher expected graft survival than that of their intended donor. PKE rules that satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness necessarily select pairwise exchanges.Such rules maximize the number of transplantations among pairs with the youngest donors, and sequentially among pairs with donors of different age groups. JEL: C78; D02; D78; I10.

show abstract

Section: General Age Structuresmentioning

confidence: 86%

“…We focus on rules 17 For each age structure Π, the associated Π age based domain satisfies the non-odd-cycle condition [7]. Thus, the weak core of the associated pairwise exchange problem is never empty.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange

Nicolò

Álvarez

2017

Games and Economic Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However these incompatible patient-donor pairs may be able to exchange kidneys with other pairs in a similar position. Kidney exchange programs have already been established in several countries, for example the USA [33, 2,35], the Netherlands [24,25], South Korea [38,26,37], Romania [29,28] and the UK [34,22].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Maximum Weight Cycle Packing in Directed Graphs, With Application to Kidney Exchange Programs

Bíró

Manlove

Rizzi

2009

Discrete Math. Algorithm. Appl.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Centralised matching programs have been established in several countries to organise kidney exchanges between incompatible patient-donor pairs. At the heart of these programs are algorithms to solve kidney exchange problems, which can be modelled as cycle packing problems in a directed graph, involving cycles of length 2, 3, or even longer. Usually the goal is to maximise the number of transplants, but sometimes the total benefit is maximised by considering the differences between suitable kidneys. These problems correspond to computing cycle packings of maximum size or maximum weight in directed graphs. Here we prove the APX-completeness of the problem of finding a maximum size exchange involving only 2-cycles and 3-cycles. We also present an approximation algorithm and an exact algorithm for the problem of finding a maximum weight exchange involving cycles of bounded length. The exact algorithm has been used to provide optimal solutions to real kidney exchange problems arising from the National Matching Scheme for Paired Donation run by NHS Blood and Transplant, and we describe practical experience based on this collaboration.

show abstract

“…Therefore in several countries various kidney exchange programmes have been established to systematically search for incompatible patient-donor pairs and possible kidney exchanges between them: in Romania [9], the Netherlands [8], USA [13]; other countries have at least changed their legislation to enable such exchanges [6]. All practical experiences as well as simulation studies (for example [12,13,14]) show that kidney exchanges really help to increase the number of transplantations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most transplantation centres organize just exchanges between two pairs [8,11,14], however, allowing longer cycles might lead to better results [12,13]. Moreover, it is also important to try to balance the desire of an individual patient for the best possible outcome for him with the need for a socially optimal solution and this is just the place for an application of game theory models and methods.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inapproximability of the kidney exchange problem

Bíró

Cechlárová

2007

Information Processing Letters

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. To overcome the shortage of kidneys available for transplantation, several countries have started various programmes of kidney exchanges between incompatible patient-donor pairs. This situation can be modelled as a cooperative game in which the players are the patient-donor pairs and their preferences are derived in the first step from the suitability of the donated kidney and in the second step from the length of the obtained cycle of exchanges. Although the core of such a cooperative game is always nonempty and one core solution can be found by the famous Top Trading Cycles algorithm, many questions concerning the structure of the core are NP-hard. In this paper we show that the problem of finding a core permutation that maximizes the number of patients who obtain a suitable kidney is not approximable within n 1−ε for any ε > 0 unless P = N P .

show abstract

The Dutch Algorithm for Allocation in Living Donor Kidney Exchange

Cited by 58 publications

References 4 publications

Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange

Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange

Maximum Weight Cycle Packing in Directed Graphs, With Application to Kidney Exchange Programs

Inapproximability of the kidney exchange problem

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About