The duration of political imprisonment: Evidence from China

Steinert, Christoph

doi:10.1177/07388942221080105

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Still, it represents an intensified application of coercive police actions against ‘politically risky populations’. Prior studies are replete with findings that ‘political imprisonment has been a key tool of repression in China ever since the crackdown on the pro-democracy protests on the Tiananmen Square’ (Steinert, 2022: 351). In that, those who are deemed to pose political risk are either formally charged and sentenced to prison, or subject to ‘extra-legal (judicial) methods in repression’ (Liu, 2019: 796).…”

Section: Police Detention As Ex-judicial Penalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a recent study of the duration of political imprisonment in China, Steinert (2022) discovered that 53.7% of political prisoners (defined as those who exercise human rights under international law) between May 1981 and June 2020 have been formally charged and sentenced. The remaining 46.3% were held in different forms of detention without trial.…”

Section: ‘Literacy Imprisonment’ (Wenziyu)—punishment Without Trial T...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, it is reasonable to assume that the magnitude of individual dangerousness is likely to play a pivotal role in shaping the selection of police detention. Subject entirely to the assessment and enforcement of public security authorities, incarcerating politically risky populations according to their risk levels has been incoherent and randomized for many decades in China (Steinert, 2022; Zhou and Yan, 2014). Still, the findings of this study speak to an upward trajectory of police leaning on administrative detention as a more favoured punishment than criminal detention over the years.…”

Section: ‘Literacy Imprisonment’ (Wenziyu)—punishment Without Trial T...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Risk, political security and extra-judicial penality under Xi

2023

Theoretical Criminology

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In authoritarian regimes, risk tends to be politically positioned to reflect the ruling party's interests, needs and priorities. In this article, I focus on the People's Republic of China (China) as a case study to isolate the issue of risk, and more specifically, analyse why risk is framed as a political tenet, what becomes the evidence of such risk, and how it relates to the country's legal approach to maintaining political stability in the Xi Jinping era. This article critically scrutinizes the latest political dynamics and police practices to argue that China has formulated an extra-judicial penal jurisprudence through what I call ‘forward-leaning’ policing (前倾式警务) against those who are perceived to present a threat of political harm. By using data on 2226 cyber-dissident cases during 2014–2021, my analysis points to this ‘warrior style’ policing being an intensified application of coercive police actions, which is heavily weighted towards incarceration as the main approach to addressing political dissent, especially through administrative detention. In doing so, the judicial process that traditionally determines conviction and sentencing is either circumvented or reduced to symbolic significance.

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Section: Police Detention As Ex-judicial Penalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: ‘Literacy Imprisonment’ (Wenziyu)—punishment Without Trial T...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: ‘Literacy Imprisonment’ (Wenziyu)—punishment Without Trial T...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Risk, political security and extra-judicial penality under Xi

2023

Theoretical Criminology

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Elitist Remedies? Complaint Resources and Representation in International Human Rights Bodies

Steinert

2024

International Studies Quarterly

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This article investigates determinants of representation in international human rights bodies. It is argued that socioeconomic factors shape whether human rights abuses translate into complaints to international human rights mechanisms. To seek international remedy, victims of human rights abuse must be aware of remedies, and they require complaint literacy to file complaints. Alternatively, they need ties to skilled networks that might represent their cases. Such complaint resources are systematically shaped by socioeconomic factors, implying that international human rights remedies tend to represent a self-selection of economic elites. The theoretical claims are tested both on the national and individual levels with novel data on the human rights complaint mechanisms operated by the UN Special Procedures (UNSP). While this mechanism is universally open, the follow-up statements of the UNSP reflect socioeconomic disparities both on the national and individual levels. On the national level, human rights abuses translate into more UNSP statements directed at richer countries. On the individual level, lawyers and professors tend to be more likely to be covered by the UNSP. The findings contribute to our understanding of representation in international human rights remedies, suggesting that these mechanisms struggle to reach marginalized groups in low-income countries.

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Drowning Out Dissent: The Thai Military’s Quest to Fabricate Popular Support on Twitter

Sirikupt

2024

The International Journal of Press/Politics

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Why and how do autocracies discursively conduct digital astroturfing against their populations? As these regimes increasingly co-opt social media to manipulate online political discourse, the current political disinformation literature continues to privilege a Cold War paradigm, focusing on countries that dominate Western foreign policy priorities and concerns. Its normative underpinnings overshadow other understudied cases that have also been weaponizing social media to manipulate domestic online discourses. Concurrently, findings from ethnographic interviews and big data approaches remain theoretically disconnected from the long-held logics of regime stabilization. I argue that regime digital astroturfing follows offline events that spark online discourses with collective action potential. In countering these discourses, regime-linked digital astroturfers exploit social media affordances to discursively cheerlead the regime and devalue regime challengers to create a semblance of popular support for the former. I adopt a mixed-methods approach informed by Contextual Text Coding to examine 14,430 tweets linked to the Royal Thai Army in February 2020 to subject my central propositions to empirical scrutiny. My findings demonstrated that astroturfing efforts on Twitter throughout this period, which discursively cheerleaded the military/autocratic regime of General Prayut Chan-o-cha and devalued their pro-democratic opposition with negative frames, were spurred by a mass shooting incident in the city of Korat that exposed the ruling elites to widespread online backlash. This contribution deepens case-specific knowledge about an understudied case in the literature and also strengthens our understanding about the adaptations of authoritarian legitimation strategies in the digital era and the militarization of social media communication.

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The duration of political imprisonment: Evidence from China

Cited by 3 publications

References 62 publications

Risk, political security and extra-judicial penality under Xi

Risk, political security and extra-judicial penality under Xi

Elitist Remedies? Complaint Resources and Representation in International Human Rights Bodies

Drowning Out Dissent: The Thai Military’s Quest to Fabricate Popular Support on Twitter

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