The duration of government formation processes in Europe

Ecker, Alejandro; Meyer, Thomas M.

doi:10.1177/2053168015622796

Cited by 24 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Today, pundits and scholars alike have recognized increasing delays in the formation of coalition governments in Europe (Ecker and Meyer, 2015). For instance, the 2016 Irish election was followed by the longest government negotiation process ever and resulted in a minority government.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Not my government!’ The role of norms and populist attitudes on voter preferences for government formation after the election

Plescia

Eberl

2019

Party Politics

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Processes of coalition government formation have recently become subject to increasing delay across Europe. There also appears to be a concurrent surge in the success of 'populist' challengers, who tend to reject key features intrinsic to pluralism such as elite bargaining and compromise. Against this background, this article investigates for the first time citizen preferences for which party should get the mandate to form the government and which parties should definitely be excluded from government formation. We focus specifically on the effect that political knowledge and populist attitudes have on citizen preferences for government formation. We find that both political knowledge and populist attitudes are essential in explaining voters' willingness or unwillingness to accept the fundamental prerequisite of coalition bargaining and political compromise. These findings have important implications for our understanding of citizens' attitudes and political representation.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Not my government!’ The role of norms and populist attitudes on voter preferences for government formation after the election

Plescia

Eberl

2019

Party Politics

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“…Recent studies have shown that bargaining complexity is linked to the level of uncertainty about the preferences and available alternatives of the potential coalition partners (Golder ; Ecker & Meyer ). In the present context, it would be easy to conclude that the relatively long bargaining process and the uniquely long government programme suggested a high level of uncertainty or lack of trust between the coalition parties.…”

Section: Uncertainty and The Government Programmementioning

confidence: 99%

Government Formation Amidst Increased Party System Complexity

Mykkänen

2019

Scand Pol Stud

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“…Golder () shows that uncertainty always delays government formation but complexity only influences the duration of coalition negotiations when information uncertainty is high. Finally, Ecker and Meyer () find few statistically significant effects in their models of the duration of coalition bargaining but conclude that these models work better in Western Europe than in the newer democracies of Eastern Europe. Institutions and rules – such as positive parliamentarism – have also been examined in the context of the effect that they have on the uncertainty or complexity of the bargaining environment.…”

Section: Presidents and The Duration Of Government Formationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Despite its importance, the study of the duration of government formation is in its infancy; just five articles have examined the causes of delays in coalition bargaining – all of which focus on either the complexity or uncertainty of the bargaining environment (De Winter & Dumont ; Diermeier & Roozendaal ; Ecker & Meyer ; Golder ; Martin & Vanberg ). While the results of previous research in this field are inconsistent, none provide a systematic account of the role of extra‐parliamentary actors in the government formation process – specifically, the influence of presidents in semi‐presidential systems.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How and when do presidents influence the duration of coalition bargaining in semi‐presidential systems?

Savage

2017

European J Political Res

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How and when do presidents influence the government formation process in semi-presidential systems? Presidents have both a formal role and vested interest in the formation of the cabinet yet their influence has been overlooked in studies of the duration of government formation. In this article, the author argues that the president's influence over government formation can be explained by their perceived legitimacy to act in the bargaining process and their partisanship. In this first case, it is argued that the legitimacy to act derives from a president's constitutional powers and more powerful presidents simplify cabinet bargaining, leading to shorter government formation periods. In the second case, it is proposed that presidents and their parties have overlapping preferences. Therefore, when the president's party holds greater bargaining power in government formation negotiations, the bargaining process is less uncertain and less complex. Thus, government formation processes will be shorter. Using survival models and data from 26 European democracies, both propositions are confirmed by the analysis. The results enhance our understanding of the dynamics of cabinet bargaining processes and contribute to the wider study of semi-presidentialism and executive-legislative relations. One broader implication of these results is that the president's party affiliation is an important motivation for them as political actors, this contrasts with some previous studies which conceive of presidents as non-partisan actors.

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The duration of government formation processes in Europe

Cited by 24 publications

References 29 publications

‘Not my government!’ The role of norms and populist attitudes on voter preferences for government formation after the election

‘Not my government!’ The role of norms and populist attitudes on voter preferences for government formation after the election

Government Formation Amidst Increased Party System Complexity

How and when do presidents influence the duration of coalition bargaining in semi‐presidential systems?

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