The Duhem Thesis

Ariew, Roger

doi:10.1093/bjps/35.4.313

Cited by 54 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…10 Duhem's thesis differs in several respects from the position later advocated by Quine (see e.g. Ariew, 1984). I gloss over these differences since the cogency of my remarks does not hinge upon such differences.…”

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confidence: 80%

Economics, Psychology, and the Unity of the Decision Sciences

Fumagalli

2015

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

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In recent years, several authors have reconstructed the relationship between 20 th century economic theory and neuro-psychological research in terms of a threestage narrative of initial unity, increasing separation and ongoing reunification. In this article, I draw on major developments in economic theory and neuropsychological research to provide a descriptive and normative critique of this reconstruction. Moreover, I put forward a reconstruction of the relationship between economics and neuro-psychology that, I claim, better fits both the available empirical evidence and the methodological foundations of these disciplines. In doing so, I argue that recent calls to develop a unified interdisciplinary framework for modelling choice are premised on disputable presuppositions concerning both the domain of economic theory and the relationship between this theory's axiomatic foundations and empirical findings about the neuro-psychological substrates of choice.Keywords: Economic Theory; Psychology; Interdisciplinary Unification; Rational Choice; Neuroeconomics. Word Count: 7287 2 IntroductionThe philosophical and methodological literature on the relationship between 20 th century economic theory and neuro-psychological research has grown remarkably during the last three decades (see e.g. Earl, 1990, Giocoli, 2003, Hands, 2010, and Hausman, 1992. Several authors (e.g. Bruni and Sugden, 2007, Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004, and Lewin, 1996 have reconstructed this relationship in terms of the following three-stage narrative (henceforth, the 'standard view'). First, we find an early period of unity, going approximately from the marginal revolution in the 1870s to the 1910s, during which neoclassical economic theory was grounded on psychological foundations. Second, there is a phase of increasing separation, prompted by developments in ordinal utility theory and revealed preference theory, culminated in the 1950s with the elimination of psychological findings, constructs and methods from mainstream economic theory. Finally, the systematic violations of mainstream economic theory documented since the 1950s fostered an ongoing reunification between economics and neuro-psychology, which builds on advances in behavioural, experimental and neuroeconomics to provide a unified interdisciplinary framework for modelling choice. The idea is that economists and neuropsychologists can and should draw on a common set of findings, constructs and methods to model choice (see e.g. Gintis, 2004, Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004, Lewin, 1996, and Rabin, 1998.In this article, I draw on major developments in economic theory and neuropsychological research to provide a descriptive and normative critique of this standard view. Moreover, I put forward a reconstruction of the relationship between economics and neuro-psychology that, I claim, better fits both the available empirical evidence and the methodological foundations of these disciplines. I shall argue for three claims of general interest to the philosophers and the practitioners of ...

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confidence: 80%

Economics, Psychology, and the Unity of the Decision Sciences

Fumagalli

2015

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

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“…Several scholars have compared Quine's and Duhem's rendering of the underdetermination thesis (Vuillemin 1978, Ariew 1984, Quine 1986, Gillies 1993 1 . But all these authors fail to come up with a general rationale driving the different viewpoints of Duhem and Quine. In this section the claim will be defended that all the main differences between Duhem's and Quine's versions of underdetermination derive from their respective stance towards the history of science.…”

Section: The Logical and The Historical View On Underdeterminationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Defending Underdetermination or Why the Historical Perspective Makes a Difference

Pietsch

2011

EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009

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Abstract:The old antagonism between the Quinean and the Duhemian view on underdetermination is reexamined. In this respect, two theses will be defended. First, it is argued that the main differences between Quine's and Duhem's versions of underdetermination derive from a different attitude towards the history of science. While Quine considered underdetermination from an ahistorical, a logical point of view, Duhem approached it as a distinguished historian of physics. On this basis, a logical and a historical version of the underdetermination thesis can be distinguished. The second thesis of the article is that the main objections against underdetermination are fatal only to the logical rendering. Taken together, the two theses constitute a defence of underdetermination.

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“…In positing ‘that there are in principle an indefinite number of theories that fit the observed facts more or less adequately’ (Ariew, 1984, p. 313), the underdetermination thesis allows scientists and researchers, when encountering a contrary empirical result, to choose one of three alternative strategies, or ‘theory‐bundle’ configurations, in order to restore consistency: (a) abandonment of the theory or hypothesis under investigation and retention of the auxiliary hypotheses; (b) retention of the theory or hypothesis under investigation and revision of any one or more of the auxiliary hypotheses, thereby rescuing the theory or hypothesis under investigation (‘auxiliary fudging’, Lipton, 1991, p. 142); or (c) revision (adjustment or tinkering) of the theory or hypothesis under investigation and retention of the auxiliary hypotheses (‘theory fudging’, Lipton, 1991, p. 142).…”

Section: Quine’s Philosophy Of Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophy of science underpinnings of prototype validation: Popper vs. Quine

Klein¹,

Herskovitz²

2007

Information Systems Journal

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Abstract. In this paper, we aim to provide prototype validation in both custom and packaged software development with a theoretical framework located within the philosophy of science. Towards that end, we consider Popperian and Quinean accounts of scientific knowledge and argue that the theoretical underpinning of prototype validation is Quine’s holistic philosophy of science, whose cornerstone principle is that all beliefs are revisable. Specifically, our thesis is that the systems developer and software consumer (user or customer) join forces – not as Popperian falsifiers, who make a decision rule to reject the prototype on account of any divergence, major or minor, from the software consumer’s mental model, but – as Quinean revisers, with the objective of fine‐tuning the prototype (or the software consumer’s mental model) so that the prototype and the software consumer’s mental model are congruent with each other. This paper suggests that prototype revisions are belief revisions, and, as such, should be guided – and are guided – by pragmatic norms, such as conservatism, simplicity and generality, and are influenced by social, or sociological, factors as well. Finally, we discuss the relevance, value and pragmatic implications of a Quinean philosophy of science framework for research and practice.

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The Duhem Thesis

Cited by 54 publications

References 4 publications

Economics, Psychology, and the Unity of the Decision Sciences

Economics, Psychology, and the Unity of the Decision Sciences

Defending Underdetermination or Why the Historical Perspective Makes a Difference

Philosophy of science underpinnings of prototype validation: Popper vs. Quine

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