The Duality of Crony Corruption in Economic Transition: Toward an Integrated Framework

Li, Peter Ping

doi:10.1007/s10551-008-9747-7

Cited by 27 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 64 publications

(116 reference statements)

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“…Corruption can lead to low levels of generalized trust, as people are not willing to trust strangers (Li 2009). According to Rothstein and Stolle (2001), the behaviors of state officials give important signals to citizens about the moral standards of the society.…”

Section: The Roles Of Formal and Informal Institutions In Social Trusmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The absence of generalized trust results in more reliance on particularized trust-trust between people from the same groups or networks in order to make social exchanges (Li 2009;Rothstein and Stolle 2001). In a study on trust and interfirm relationships in Vietnam, Nguyen et al (2005) found that mutual acquaintances facilitate the establishing of trust and relationships between two strangers.…”

Section: The Roles Of Formal and Informal Institutions In Social Trusmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Trust Issues and Engaged Buddhism: The Triggers for Skillful Managerial Approaches

Tran

2019

J Bus Ethics

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As a transitional economy, Vietnam has undergone tremendous changes over recent decades within a 'fusion' context that blends both traditional and modern values from its complex history. However, few studies have explored how contemporary issues in the context of Vietnam have brought both obstacles and skillful initiatives to managerial approaches to doing business. We draw on the concepts of social trust and institutional theory to explore how informal institutions such as religious forces can contribute to the development of individual trust and whether individuals are willing to extend trust beyond familial networks. We contribute to the notion of a moral conception of trust by exploring how Buddhism in particular has initiated distinctive managerial approaches in the context of Vietnam, in response to dilemmas of social trust. Our findings highlight that as an informal institution, engaged Buddhism yields significant impact on the formation of social trust. We carried out in-depth interviews in Vietnam with 33 organizational leaders who were Buddhist practitioners, using thematic analysis to elucidate our findings and arguments. The study reveals how the incorporation of Buddhist principles has fostered context-sensitive, non-extreme, and reflexive managerial approaches to enhance morality as a response to social trust issues.Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

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Section: The Roles Of Formal and Informal Institutions In Social Trusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Roles Of Formal and Informal Institutions In Social Trusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust Issues and Engaged Buddhism: The Triggers for Skillful Managerial Approaches

Tran

2019

J Bus Ethics

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“…The autocrat typically co‐opts supporters through preferential economic privileges. Autocracies use their legal systems to create and preserve economic advantages for crony firms (Donaldson ; Li ). Autocracies can close down rival firms while depriving them of any recourse to independent courts or a free press.…”

Section: Autocratic Political Power Needs Cronyism and Opacitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Autocratic tensions, cronyism, and the opacity of business information: party newspapers and circulation figures during the Francoist dictatorship (1939–1975)

Gago‐Rodríguez

Nickel

2016

Business Ethics: A European Review

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Autocracies draw their political power from cronyism and organized repression. The opacity of business information (economic censorship) protects these regimes and their crony firms from any opposition. However, autocracies might also desire to eliminate cronyism (and therefore opacity) because it dampens economic growth. Autocracies survive through repression that engenders tensions, as evident in the Spanish newspaper industry during the Francoist dictatorship. State control over this industry was important because the press disseminated news to the public. From 1939 to 1957, the autocracy institutionalized both cronyism and the opacity of circulation figures to sustain the political powers of Franco and the single party state. Opacity concealed the economic performance of newspapers owned by sole legal party and any distribution of resources in its favor. Franco authorized voluntary disclosure of reliable circulation figures in 1964, after eliminating cronyism in favor of a freer market. Repression guaranteed support for this industry until Franco's death.

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“…We need a fine‐grained perspective to define corruption in nondemocratic societies, the more so when a country is in a transition process from a centrally‐led government to a market economy (Luo, ; Hodgson and Shuxia, ; Guerrero and Rodríguez‐Oreggia, ; Li, ). The word ‘corruption’ is used to mean different things in different countries and different global contexts (Bardhan, ; Collier, ; Kurer, ; Kwok and Tadesse, ).…”

Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Personal Relationships on Bribery Incidence in Transition Economies

Jong

Tú

Ees

2014

European Management Review

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Prior work on corruption has largely overlooked personal relationships as an essential determinant of bribery incidence in transition economies. In these countries, relationships with public officials are instrumental in enabling transactions and lowering transaction costs, due to incoherent and ever-changing business regulations. Our study examines the impact of personal relationships on bribery incidence in Vietnam, finding that relationships with central government officials decreases the likelihood of bribery, while relationships with local government officials increases the likelihood of bribery. The results provide convincing support for the alleged importance of public-private relationships in contemporary transition economies.

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The Duality of Crony Corruption in Economic Transition: Toward an Integrated Framework

Abstract: local corporatism, crony corruption, dual-track transition, formal–informal interplay, economic–political interplay, China,

Cited by 27 publications

References 64 publications

Trust Issues and Engaged Buddhism: The Triggers for Skillful Managerial Approaches

Trust Issues and Engaged Buddhism: The Triggers for Skillful Managerial Approaches

Autocratic tensions, cronyism, and the opacity of business information: party newspapers and circulation figures during the Francoist dictatorship (1939–1975)

The Impact of Personal Relationships on Bribery Incidence in Transition Economies

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