The Downward Causality and the Hard Problem of Consciousness or Why Computer Programs Do not Work in the Dark

Abstract

Abstract:Any low-level processes, the sequence of chemical interactions in a living cell, muscle cellular activity, processor commands or neuron interaction, is possible only if there is a downward causality, only due to uniting and controlling power of the highest level. Therefore, there is no special "hard problem of consciousness", i.e. the problem of relation of ostensibly purely biological materiality and non-causal mentality -we have only the single philosophical problem of relation between the upward and downward causalities, the problem of interrelation between hierarchic levels of existence. It is necessary to conclude that the problem of determinacy of chemical processes by the biological ones and the problem of neuron interactions caused by consciousness are of one nature and must have one solution.Keywords: consciousness, hard problem, downward causality.The hard problem of consciousness was formulated by David Chalmers as a necessity to complement human brain functioning with a conscious experience and subjective mental pictures. ("The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience" [1, p. 201]). This is definitely a stumbling rock for any theories of consciousness, based on the conception of causal closure of the physical: if brain can process all information, transform all the incoming signals into actions without any subjective feelings, then for what brain needs consciousness at all? Let us try to analyze the problem, using the example of computer analogy, i.e. let us focus our attention on a classical Chalmers' question: "why doesn't all this information-processing go on 'in the dark'?" [1, p. 203], in relation to a computer.At the first glance, this question, when asked about computer functioning, seems just trivial and good-for-nothing. Any "dummy" can understand that while, for example, converting a video file we can turn off the screen, PC-speakers, printer and after this a computer will successfully complete an information processing "in the dark" paying no attention to our actions. And at this point we can say that images on the screen (for example, a line which shows us the status of a process) are nothing more than "epiphenomena" -only the "accompaniment" (in Chalmers' terms) of a real information processing. There seems to be a complete analogy between the information processes in our brain and the mental picture in our consciousness on one hand and the information processing and its display on the screen on the other hand.But something compels us to resist the temptation of such an easy solution. There is something wrong with this analogy. We understand that a computer, which works only for itself, is a senseless thing, a thing-in-itself. We realize that everything we can interpret as an external "mental" manifestations of computer functioning: a video edit, a photo correction, a computer